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formula for winning the war they have been proved wrong. Yet, we have not only been patient with these strategists; we have permitted them to launch new and larger ventures. Many Members of the Congress, even those with deep apprehension about our growing involvement in the Vietnam struggle, have kept silent or have restrained their dissent rather than risk weakening the various strategies we have tried on the battlefield. Now the time has come to exercise the same patience and perseverance in the search for a peaceful settlement. Just as we have tried a wide range of military efforts, and experiments of various kinds, we now need to try a full range of diplomatic and political efforts to end the war. Patience is cheaper than blood, and an honorable peace is better than the length of the daily body count. Prime Minister Shastri's last recorded words, spoken to his defense minister, were: "We must fight for peace bravely as we fought in war." That is an appropriate admonition to all nations.

So let us not be too quick to launch the bombing attacks again. I think it is clear that we have nothing to gain and much to lose by resuming the bombing of North Vietnam. First of all, these attacks have been largely ineffective militarily. They were designed to stop the flow of North Vietnamese soldiers into South Vietnam, but as Secretary McNamara observed recently, after returning from a trip to Vietnam, there are now several times as many North Vietnamese in the south as when we started the bombing last February. Furthermore, we have suffered a heavy loss of skilled pilots and costly airplanes in the bombing effort. Sometimes they look at the losses on the other side, but they do not consider the losses on our side. Our losses have been excessive in terms of the limited damage to the enemy's military capability. In one instance reported to me, we lost three highly trained pilots and three expensive bombers trying unsuccessfully to knock out a little bridge of secondary military importance. As a former bomber pilot who has asked many questions of some of our thoughtful military tacticians, I see little or no military advantage in resuming the bombing of North Vietnam. Quite the contrary, the record indicates that North Vietnam responds to the bombings by sending more forces southward. In other words the bombing missions in the north may result in the death of more American soldiers in the South.

Nor is there any compelling diplomatic or political reason for resuming the bombings. They have not put Hanoi in a more favorable mood to negotiate. The lessons of recent history are that bombing attacks infuriate and unite a people behind their government in rigid resistance to the attackers. To produce a climate favorable for discussion, which is now the announced top priority of our Government, both sides need time for the clash of battle, the hatreds, and tensions to cool down. That process cannot be enhanced by resuming the bombing raids on the bridges and buildings

that the people of North Vietnam have built at such sacrifice in recent years.

Furthermore, President Johnson with imagination and vision has sent his top diplomats around the world and around this city to the various embassies, urging many other governments to use their good offices in persuading the Government of North Vietnam to enter discussions with us looking toward a settlement of the war. Friendly governments in eastern Europe, such as Yugoslavia and many other countries have at our request agreed to assist in the search for a peaceful settlement. These concerned governments which have placed their confidence in us have urged for months that we halt the bombing. Now they need time—perhaps many months—to convince Hanoi that a satisfactory settlement can be achieved with the United States, and with other interested governments and groups which are involved in the struggle. If we were to resume bombings now or in the near future, I tremble to think of the staggering blow this would be to our presently favorable position with the many governments whose help we have asked in the search for peace.

I sometimes think that one of the great, unrecognized costs of this crisis is that we have neglected our relationships with other major countries that are important to the long-range security of our country and peace of the world.

A front-page story in today's New York Times reports:

The Governments of Britain, France and Japan, all allies of the United States, and the Communist governments of Europe as well as the governments of a number of non-aligned nations are said to be pleading for several more weeks or even months of restraint. More time is needed for diplomatic maneuver, they maintain, and for a better assessment of North Vietnam's interest in tempering if not settling the conflict.

Mr. President, these countries are being bitterly chided by Red China who is telling them that the bombing pause is just a lull before we hit even harder. Let us not play into the hands of the Chinese Communists and undercut our friends by resuming the bombing as China insists we are about to do.

It would seem to me that we should also exercise caution in the conduct of the war in the south. I frankly was puzzled by our recent offensive in the delta involving 8,000 American soldiers. Why is it necessary to engage in such large offensive operations during this intensive search for a peaceful settlement? I hope there will be no more such engagements undertaken by us unless the other side forces the issue. We are advised by the President and by others that it has been several weeks since any North Vietnamese forces have engaged our troops in battle and that Vietcong initiated incidents have been reduced during the bombing pause. Why, then should we needlessly risk the death of our own soldiers in major offensive campaigns when our diplomats are trying to reach an end to the war? Would it not be more realistic and sensible to defend our present position and hold the line while the peace efforts are underway rather than to launch new operations that can only lead

to loss of life and perhaps complicate the search for a settlement? Now would seem the time to escalate the peace offensive and escalate the killing. As Senator JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, one of the wisest Members of the Senate and in our country, put it in a thoughtful statement recently:

Negotiation, not escalation, should be the dominant theme of our activity now.

Let me make my own position clear. I have never agreed with the foreign policy assumptions that first took us into southeast Asia in an active combat role. Nor do I accept those assumptions now. Southeast Asia is outside the perimeter of our vital interests. Furthermore, it is an area convulsed by nationalistic revolutionary movements aimed at ineffective and sometimes corrupt local regimes. We identify with such regimes and against popular revolutionary movements at our peril. We have no commitment or interest in southeast Asia that justifies the sacrifice of American troops on the scale necessary to win a military decision.

In 1954 when the French were on the verge of military disaster in Vietnam, there were those who urged that American troops be sent in an effort to turn the tide. That move was blocked in considerable part because of the sound advice of our then Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Matthew Ridgway, whose warnings made sense to another experienced general, President Dwight Eisenhower. In his book, "Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway," published in 1956, General Ridgway wrote:

When the day comes for me to face my Maker and account for my actions, the thing I would be most humbly proud of was the fact that I fought against, and perhaps contributed to preventing the carrying out of some harebrained tactical schemes which would have cost the lives of thousands of men. To that list of tragic accidents that fortunately never happened I would add the Indochina intervention.

In hearings before the Armed Services Committee and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate in May 1951, the late Gen. Douglas MacArthur—a man of vast military experience in Asia, confirmed an earlier statement he had made on NBC when he asserted: "Anybody who commits the land power of the United States on the continent of Asia ought to have his head examined."

At the same hearing, one of our wisest and ablest generals of World War II, Gen. Omar Bradley, said:

I would hate very much to see us involved in a land war in Asia. I think we would be fighting a wrong war at the wrong place and against a wrong enemy.

I agree with General Ridgway, General MacArthur, General Bradley—and, more recently, with General James Gavin—and others that the United States should never commit our manpower to a major war on the Asian mainland except in the event of a direct attack on the United States such as occurred at Pearl Harbor some 25 years ago.

Anyone who believes that it is easy for a Western power to win a war against Asia's limitless manpower, its dense jungles, and its vast terrain should read the testimony of our generals in full when

they were being interrogated for the record. If those warnings do not suffice, let those who advocate a bigger war, and who are in a hurry to resume the bombing and step up the war, ponder the careful language of Senator MANSFIELD and his colleagues:

If present trends continue, there is no assurance as to what ultimate increase in American military commitment will be required before the conflict is terminated. For the fact is that under present terms of reference and as the war has evolved, the question is not one of applying increased U.S. pressure to a defined military situation, but rather of pressing against a military situation which is, in effect, open ended.

Mr. President, those are sober words. They are not overly emotional. I believe that the "open ended" situation to which the Mansfield report refers is the pathway to Armageddon and the loss of our national strength in a war without end.

So I oppose any further extension of this highly dangerous war.

Furthermore, I believe the President is right in making certain modifications in our previous diplomatic position so that we can better clear the path to a conference with the other side. I said recently in an NBC televised interview that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate an end to this war without recognizing the primary interest of the South Vietnamese rebel leaders in both the negotiations and the postwar provisional government. This, I think, has been a major barrier to negotiations. If one studies the two proposed negotiating positions of Hanoi and Washington, it becomes clear that one sticking point centers on the question of whether or not the National Liberation Front of the Vietcong shall play a role in the negotiations and in the postwar settlement. At a time when this group is in control of two-thirds of the terrain and from one-third to one-half of the people of Vietnam, it is unrealistic to think that they can be left out of the negotiating efforts or the post-war settlement. Such an approach would have been paralleled in our early history if King George III had expressed a willingness to negotiate with our French ally while ignoring George Washington and his rebel Americans.

As to what specific part the Vietcong rebels should play in the postwar provisional government of South Vietnam, that is a matter to be decided at the conference table and eventually to be decided by free elections on the part of the people of Vietnam. I am encouraged by recent reports that our Government has indicated a new willingness to recognize these political realities.

We need to pursue the search for peace in Vietnam in a variety of ways until the war is ended. If we can afford to experiment for long years with costly techniques of destruction, we ought to have the self discipline to devote at least the balance of this year to the search for peace before we consider any extension of the war. Each time our strategists have mistakenly predicted that the war would be won if we just tried one more technique or expansion, we have simply redoubled the military prescription. And now Senator MANSFIELD and his colleagues

report, after all the sacrifice, that the military lines are about the same at the end of 1965 as they were at the end of 1964.

We have gone, almost without realizing what was happening, from a seemingly harmless offer of economic assistance some 12 years ago, offers by President Eisenhower, to the point where we now have almost one-fourth of a million American men on land and immediately offshore on naval units engaged in combat roles.

We have been bombing South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, and now, folly of follies, there are those who are urging that we ought to bomb Cambodia and the cities of North Vietnam and perhaps even China.

But each extension of the war has only resulted in more troops from the other side. So let those who talk of easy solutions through more soldiers and more bombs and more guns recognize that their past advice has only taken more of our soldiers to their deaths. In one breath these strategists deplore that American boys are coming home in wooden boxes. But in the next breath they offer a so-called victory formula that might send 100,000 young Americans home in boxes. They say to the President, let us not talk of ending this war until we have destroyed the enemy, until we have won a victory.

Do they know what that means? Have they counted the cost? Do they know that may involve sending a million American boys to the jungles of Asia to pursue an elusive rebel force that is everywhere and yet nowhere—a rebel force that defeated the cream of the French Army, a force of half a million men? Do they know that we are confronted by dedicated guerrilla fighters so intermingled with the civilian populace that to kill the guerrillas would involve slaughtering men, women, and children by the tens of thousands whose support we need?

A veteran reporter of the New York Times, Jack Languth, after spending more than a year traveling with our forces in South Vietnam and viewing the operations at first hand, came to the conclusion that we might be able to win a military victory of sorts. However, he said that to do it we would have to kill at least two or three innocent men, women, and children who are on our side for every Vietcong guerrilla we were able to destroy.

Mr. President, I suggest that that is a price that is not worthy of the interest involved.

A year ago when some of us took the Senate floor to warn against the deepening United States involvement in that self-defeating war and to urge that our country express its willingness to negotiate an honorable settlement, we were accused on this floor of running up a white flag and deserting our President. But as I said then, those gentlemen who talk of the total victory will not be the ones who give their lives in that so-called victory. It will be our sons and the sons of other nations. Nor will those gentlemen who call for total victory necessarily stand with the President. Some of them will try to turn this dangerous venture

that they urge on the President into a political gain for themselves and political destruction for the President and his administration.

That is what they did when the Korean involvement turned sour 15 years ago, and that is what they would try to do with Vietnam.

In June of 1950, President Truman ordered American troops to Korea to turn back the Communist invaders from North Korea. That mission had a limited purpose—to repel the aggressors and reestablish the legitimacy of the 38th parallel. In a few months' time, with a moderate loss of life, our troops drove the invader back to his side of that demarcation line. But the momentum of the war took charge and the administration nervously approved sending our troops far into North Korea to try for a total victory over the enemy. Then came the great tragedy of the Korean war. As our troops approached the Chinese border, Peiping ordered its forces into the war a million strong—in spite of General MacArthur's intelligence reports that this would not happen. The Korean war then took on a bloody dimension that eventually cost us 50,000 American casualties and billions of dollars. In the end, after months of bloodshed, we finally settled on a cease fire at the 38th parallel, which we could have had at a fraction of the cost in lives and treasure many long months earlier had we not seen fit to escalate the war.

So I hope and pray that the President will continue the bombing pause in North Vietnam indefinitely, that he will confine our military action in South Vietnam so that we lose the least possible number of those brave American men I visited in Vietnam last month—that he will go all out not for a so-called victory which only means that the jungles of Asia will be drenched with American blood—but rather that he will continue to expand and diversify and strengthen the quest for a peaceful settlement.

On July 27 of last year, I took the Senate floor to describe what I believed to be the realities then facing us in Vietnam. Because I believe that analysis is equally valid today, I quote a few of my earlier remarks as follows:

We are talking here, however, of a major war involving thousands of American casualties, the expenditure of billions of dollars, vast bloodshed and destruction for the Vietnamese people, and an uncertain outcome. There are other possible side results of such a war that may be even more serious in the long run than the war itself, including:

(1) the worsening of relations between the world's two major nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and the United States;

(2) the strengthening of the most belligerent leadership elements in the Communist world and the weakening of the moderate forces;

(3) the growing conviction in Asia, whether justified or not, that the United States is a militaristic power with a low regard for the lives of Asians and an excessive concern over other people's ideologies and political struggles; and

(4) the derailment of efforts toward world peace and the improvement of life in the developing countries, to say nothing of its impact on our own hopes, for a better society.

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The questions now before us, I said on July 27, are:

(1) Do we continue to accelerate the struggle toward a major war? (2) Do we call it off and withdraw our forces? or (3) Do we consolidate our present position, keep our casualties at a minimum, and hold out indefinitely for a negotiated settlement?

I strongly recommend the third course. I urge that we stop the bombing attacks in both North and South Vietnam. Bombing is largely ineffective in a guerrilla war and more often than not kills the wrong people. We should also stop the jungle land skirmishes which subject our soldiers to ambush. Instead, let us consolidate our troops in a holding action in the cities and well-defended enclaves along the coast. We can hold the cities and the coastal enclaves with few casualties and with little likelihood that the Vietcong will attack frontally. Such a plan would provide a haven for anti-Communist, pro-Government citizens including the religious groups, and would demonstrate that we are not going to be pushed out.

Furthermore, it is based on the realities of the present political and military map of Vietnam. While we are in control of the cities and the coast, the guerrillas control most of the rural and village areas. To dislodge them would be to destroy in the process thousands of the innocent civilians we are trying to save.

And I might add, whose support will decide in the long run the outcome of this struggle.

A policy of restricting our military efforts in Vietnam to a holding action in the cities and the coastal enclaves will avoid this kind of self-defeating jungle warfare. We can supply, feed, and defend, the urban and coastal areas with a modest effort and minimum loss of life. This is a strategy that calls primarily for restraint and patience until such time as the Vietcong get it through their heads that we will not be pushed out. I have been critical of our unilateral Vietnam involvement, and I think the original commitment and its acceleration was a mistake. But we made the commitment, and I would be prepared to support the kind of holding action outlined above until we can reach an acceptable settlement of the struggle.

That ends the remarks that I made on the Senate floor last July.

Mr. President, that approach to our present involvement in Vietnam has recently been recommended in convincing terms by former Gen. James M. Gavin, in a communication for the current issue of Harper's magazine. I hope all of our policymakers will read that thoughtful communication by one of our most able former generals.

Since I made the foregoing remarks last July, our pilots have flown thousands of bombing sorties. Let me say here parenthetically that we have never sent any better men into combat than those pilots and our other men now fighting in Vietnam. We have sent another 125,000 troops into combat—a thousand of them giving their lives and another 5,000 being maimed or wounded since last summer. The Vietnamese people, caught in the crossfire between the two sides, have been ground to death by the thousands in recent months.

These developments have only served to strengthen my conviction of months ago that we must find a way to end this war. I believe that involves continuing the bombing pause. I believe it involves consolidating the line militarily, while

pushing in every possible way for a peaceful settlement. I know that is going to be difficult, painful, and perhaps not an entirely happy outcome. But the alternative, as the Mansfield report makes perfectly clear, is a larger and bloodier war, which I think is sheer madness.

During my tour of Vietnam I visited, among other installations, a large American airbase. At one point the driver made a mistaken turn, and we found our car blocked by a large flatbed truck. As I remember, there were several other trucks waiting to pull into the road behind it. As we sat there, I noticed that the truck carried a long row of silent coffins, each one bearing the address in the United States of a fallen soldier: a sergeant from Oklahoma, a captain from Minnesota, a Marine corporal from Tennessee, a major from Connecticut, with all those different names that make up the United States—Scandinavian, Irish, German, Czech.

I sat there momentarily looking at those coffins glistening silently in the sun, and I thought what a tragic waste of young life and laughter and love. The day before I visited a hopelessly overcrowded civilian hospital in Da Nang with all its torn victims of the war—children with their legs and arms torn from their bodies by the bombing attacks; old men, mothers and infants, blasted and burned by napalm jelly, some mutilated almost beyond recognition—all of them watching us silently, without a murmur and without a sound, as we moved around from bed to bed in that overcrowded hospital.

I wondered then, as I did while we waited before that truck carrying the bodies of American soldiers, have I done my part as a Senator to prevent this from happening? Have I spoken out honestly and courageously enough? What more can I do as a citizen and as a Senator to help move mankind toward a better solution of our differences than this?

The last time I was so deeply moved by the tragedy of senseless violence was when I stood in Arlington Cemetery in November of 1963 and saw a gallant young President laid to rest. Recall his words:

So let us begin anew—remembering on both sides that civility is not a sign of weakness, and sincerity is always subject to proof. Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.

In what I personally regard as his greatest speech, the American University speech of June 10, 1963, which opened the way for the nuclear test ban treaty, he cited that ancient Biblical promise, "When a man's ways please the Lord, he maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him." I believe we share his resolution that "We shall do our part to build a world of peace where the weak are safe and the strong are just. We are not helpless before that task or hopeless of its success. Confident and unafraid," he said, "we labor on—not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace."

That, I believe, is the deepest desire of our great President, Lyndon Johnson,

of Vice President Humphrey whose every instinct reaches out for peace, and of Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, with whom I happen to disagree on some of their recommendations, but who have for years sacrificed every ounce of their energy of mind and body to their country for what they believed was the national interest. That is the desire, too, of Ambassador Goldberg and Averell Harriman and our other leaders. The cause of peace is the most urgent heartthrob of every American mother and father. It is the wistful hope of our young men—of their wives and girl friends. I believe it is the most profound longing of a war-weary world.

Our President said in his superb state of the Union address a few days ago: "I will try to end this battle and return our sons to their desires."

I have the faith to believe that however difficult the task, President Johnson has the will and the capacity to achieve this high purpose, and achieving it, to win that high place in history—that blessing of immortality reserved for those who make peace among men and nations.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Dakota yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HARRIS in the chair). Does the Senator from South Dakota yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I yield.

Mr. CLARK. I congratulate the Senator from South Dakota on a brilliant, carefully logical, and, to my way of thinking, irrefutable approach to the difficult problem which confronts us in Vietnam.

This is a speech which is not only beautifully organized from a logical and persuasive point of view, but it is also an eloquent speech, with a clear understanding of the human values involved in the useless and largely unnecessary slaughter which is presently going on in Vietnam.

I congratulate the Senator. I wish I had the ability to write a similar analysis of our problems today and to suggest an equally cogent and reasonable solution.

Let me say to the Senator that he need have no fear that he has not done his part as a Senator to keep these tragic events from continuing to happen. He certainly has spoken out, honestly and courageously. I would hope that every one of his 99 colleagues would read his speech and ask themselves the same question I asked myself as the Senator was speaking: Have I done my part as a Senator to keep this slaughter from continuing? Have I spoke out honestly and courageously enough? Do I believe in this war to total victory in the jungles of southeast Asia, and, if so, why?

I certainly feel, as does the Senator, that it would be a tragic mistake to start the bombing of North Vietnam again, until such time as it is clear beyond peradventure that there is no reasonable hope we can end this useless, tragic slaughter either by moving the war from the battlefield to the negotiating table, or, in the alternative, to a mutual but unilateral de-escalation as a result of which the shooting will slowly but surely

stop, as it did in Malaya some years ago, the Senator will recall.

If the Senator will permit me, I should like to make a few comments and then ask him to observe whether he would agree with them or not.

I have seen in the newspapers that of some 2,600 villages in South Vietnam, the South Vietnamese Government, and ourselves control a mere 700. I have seen maps—as I am sure the Senator has, too—which show the minimal amount of real estate which is still, 24 hours a day, under the control of the South Vietnamese Army or of the American Army.

I have seen three little enclaves which are held by our side in the middle of the country, in the northern part of South Vietnam, enclaves which to my untutored gaze—although I served in World War II for 4 years—are potential Dienbienphus.

I do not believe that we control all of the coastline. I believe the maps show that we control only the major portion. I was told by two members of the Mansfield committee the other day—and I am sure there is nothing secret about this—that when the senatorial airplane took off from the Saigon airport to leave the country, the Vietcong had to be chased off the runway with napalm bombs. I have been told that the Vietcong are within 3 miles of the perimeter of Saigon, that most of the food that the people of Saigon eat has already had a tax levied upon it by the Vietcong, that the highways could be cut and interdicted at any time, and that 80 percent of the members serving in the Vietcong army were born and brought up in South Vietnam, although they may have temporarily gone to the north and then come back.

I have been told that access to the city of Saigon from the sea by water is a channel only one ship wide, that there are 35 ships awaiting to be unloaded in that harbor, that only one ship can get in at a time, that in darkness the waterway could be cut, in all likelihood, by sinking one or two junks across it any time the Vietcong wish to do so, that the huge oil supplies necessary for the use of our Air Force and the South Vietnamese Air Force are in constant jeopardy from sabotage and attack, being located, as they are, in the area of Saigon, and that the only reason the Vietcong do not render Saigon untenable is that we have not bombed Hanoi, that actually one capital city stands as hostage for the other.

I wonder whether the Senator from South Dakota has similar information, and what comments he may care to make on what I have just said.

Mr. McGOVERN. Before I comment on the Senator's questions, which are certainly pertinent and go to the heart of some of the realities we face, I thank him for the kind words he just spoke about my remarks on the Senate floor this afternoon. As he knows, we have been in agreement on this issue, for the most part, for many months. I have felt that the Senator from Pennsylvania has spoken out as clearly, as forcefully, and as courageously on this issue, and, perhaps more important, as accurately, as any Member of the Senate. So to have

his statement here in the RECORD reinforcing what I have tried to say makes me all the more confident of my position. I am very grateful to him.

With regard to the points he has made respecting the military situation that faces us in Vietnam, I do not feel in a position to comment with any great technical knowledge about that, but I do agree with the Senator that it is a very discouraging prospect. I do not think our own military people in South Vietnam are under any illusions about what they are up against. We have highly competent military officers in Vietnam. They have made clear, from General Westmoreland on down, a military victory would require an enormous increase in American forces.

The French military effort ended with a disastrous defeat at Dien Bien Phu some 12 years ago in spite of the fact that they had committed a land force of something over 400,000 men. That is twice the number we have now committed to this conflict.

So I do not blame our military people for asking for reinforcements. I think they realize, as the Senator from Pennsylvania does, that they are up against a dangerous situation.

I do question the policy assumptions that have led us into this situation in Vietnam and the military mission we have asked our forces to undertake.

Mr. CLARK. I share the Senator's concern. I would hope the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, the President of the United States, would redefine for us our diplomatic and military policies in Vietnam, and just what our military and diplomatic objectives are.

I am as concerned as is the Senator from South Dakota at the escalation of the war and having our American boys hunting through elephant grass to look for the elusive Vietcong. As Walter Lippmann said some time ago, what we are doing there is very much like trying to punch water. As soon as one pulls out his arm, the water comes back, and often spills over him.

The policy which the Senator from South Dakota has advocated is to fight a defensive war at our strongpoints—I would hope with our backs to the sea—while we proceed in an honorable way to try to persuade the Communists and others in South Vietnam who are not Communists—and there are many of those—that we are not going to leave until there is an honorable peace that will include free elections by the people of South Vietnam to select those they want to govern them.

What concerns me is what appears to be a tug of war between various highly located persons in the executive and administrative arms of our Government. For example, I read this in the newspapers. I did not acquire this information through access to any classified document. It was stated that General Westmoreland and Ambassador Lodge are really opposed to negotiating at this point because they believe the military situation is too unfortunate from our point of view to enable us to get a satisfactory settlement.

The map to which I referred gives graphic evidence that the question involved is how many Americans we are prepared to have killed in order to improve the military situation. I for one do not want a single American killed to reclaim useless jungle land in South Vietnam.

Although I expressed it more explosively than did the Senator from South Dakota, I wonder if he would comment on my statement.

Mr. McGOVERN. I think the Senator's point is well taken. If we had some assurance that after prodigious military effort on our part we would have created conditions that would permit democracy to flourish in South Vietnam, perhaps some argument could be made that the effort would be worthwhile. We have no such assurance. What we do have is some indication that the more we try to attack the Vietcong forces by military means, the more we terrorize and destroy the civilian population with which they are intermingled.

One of the reporters who has been over there for some time and who has been watching our efforts to destroy the Vietcong forces in the villages and jungles has suggested that the attacks we are making would make more sense if we were fighting an enemy rather than an ally. What he meant was that when we bomb a village or area controlled by the Vietcong guerrillas, or when we shell those areas or spray them with machine-gun bullets, or destroy their crops we are destroying and alienating the civilian population, whose aid we will need if we are to attain our objective.

Mr. CLARK. And to continue these tactics makes the result almost inevitable that we will lose any election which we may prearrange.

Mr. McGOVERN. That is my own judgment. I have tried to read the history of what happened when the French were involved against the Vietcong from 1945 to about 1954. A number of people who have written about that struggle have said that one of the most frequently used tactics of the Vietcong—which were then called the Vietminh—was to put up a flag in a village friendly to the French Government, or to take a pot shot at a French airplane. The French would then bomb that village or area—thereby losing the support of the people, and another area would go to the Communist side. It seems to me there is a danger of our falling into the same trap.

Mr. CLARK. One factor which no amount of acceleration of the war or increase in American aid is going to change is that it is impossible to tell foe from friend. They all look exactly alike. A friend of mine, a Pennsylvanian, a great statesman, an eminent politician, said that it was like things were during the troubles over the Irish Republic. One Irishman looked exactly like another. During the day they would say, "Three cheers for Great Britain," and as soon as dark fell, they would go out and shoot the British troops. It is difficult to distinguish friend from foe. While the clothes and the climate and the location are different, there is an analogy to any guerrilla warfare where forces try to do

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things that the people do not want them to do.

I will ask the Senator to comment on two more points.

First, I was under the view until recently that this was not our war, but that it was a war which involved the people of South Vietnam; but that it had been our policy to send them technical assistance and support. My recollection is that at the end of 1963 we had 10,000 men there. The next year it increased to 34,000, and we now have some 200,000 there. The President has sent to us an appropriation request to enable him to increase the number of our military forces by more than 100,000, with the implication that some of these additional forces will also go to Vietnam.

I wonder whether the Senator from South Dakota agrees with my view that there should be a full debate in some depth on the floor of the Senate before we agree to the requested appropriation. Certainly we should not be parties to a unanimous consent which would enable the request to be rushed through in 5 hours, as the request for \$700 million was rushed through last year.

I would hope that the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee would ask searching questions of Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to what they plan to do with the money. Are they committed to escalate the war or not?

I do not wish to put the Senator from South Dakota in an invidious position, nor do I desire to indicate that I shall vote against the request.

Does the Senator believe that the time has come for debate with respect to the Vietnamese policy?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I welcome the opportunity to comment on that question. The Senator is not putting me on the spot.

I believe that one of the unfortunate aspects of our South Vietnam involvement is that there has been so little searching and thoughtful debate either in committee or on the floor of the Senate.

As I indicated in my remarks earlier, we did not make any commitment originally to fight a war on behalf of South Vietnam or anyone else. What President Eisenhower said in October 1954, when he made the first American offer of assistance to South Vietnam, was that we would make available a modest amount of economic aid, provided the government in Saigon would carry out some desperately needed political and social reforms. Those reforms were never carried out. We were absolved at that point, with respect to the offers of economic assistance.

We maintained for the next 10 years, that this was not our war; that this was basically a struggle to be resolved by the people of South Vietnam.

President Kennedy said in a press conference in September 1963, a few months before he was killed, that in the final analysis this was their war; that they were the ones who must win or lose it. He said that we can send men there as advisers and offer a certain amount of equipment, but we cannot win a war for

freedom for other people. This is a struggle they have to win for themselves.

I believe that it is disastrous from the standpoint of our own interests and the interests of the people of South Vietnam for us to try to impose a military and political solution in that part of the world from the outside.

I agree with the Senator from Pennsylvania in his hope that one day elections can be held, hopefully under international supervision. I do not believe that it necessarily follows that the elections would go against our interests.

I do not know what the outcome would be. But if arrangements could be made for honest elections under international supervision, we ought to abide by the result, even though we do not like the government that might emerge.

We found in Eastern and Central Europe, that when a country like Yugoslavia took on a Communist government, the world did not come to an end.

If we did not have problems with other countries any more serious than the problems we have with Yugoslavia, we could celebrate with joy. It is not fatal to American security when an election does not come out as I would like to see it come out. We can continue to exert influence in various ways as we have in Eastern Europe and even in our relations with the Soviet Union.

Mr. CLARK. I congratulate my friend from South Dakota for the fine address he made. I associate myself with his recommendations.

I hope that our beloved friend, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and the President, who I understand announced this afternoon that bombing would resume at the end of the new year holiday, will take a hard look at the recommendations of Omar Bradley, Ridgway, MacArthur, and Gavin and have second thoughts as to the desirability of accelerating this war.

I thank the Senator.

Mr. MCGOVERN. I thank the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of my NBC interview with Sander Vanocur of January 5, 1966; a press release of that date; and a New York Times article, written by E. W. Kenworthy, published on January 6, 1966, be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SENATOR GEORGE MCGOVERN

Mr. MERRILL MUELLER. Congress reassembles next week, and it's expected that sometime in the next 2 months there will be a debate on our future course in Vietnam. Since Congress adjourned last fall, many legislators went to Vietnam for a firsthand look at the war, its causes and its effects. Their voices will be heard when the debate takes place.

One Senator who has been over there, GEORGE MCGOVERN, Democrat, of South Dakota, is in our Washington studio this morning with "Today Show" Correspondent Sander Vanocur. Sandy?

Mr. SANDER VANOCUR. Thank you, Merrill. Senator MCGOVERN, what is the future for the United States in Vietnam, after you've been there and taken a look for yourself?

Senator GEORGE MCGOVERN. Well, Sandy, I think the best we can hope for is a negotiated

settlement. I don't see how either the other side or our side can score a decisive military victory. We have a truly superb group of military men fighting in Vietnam. I don't think this country has ever assembled a more capable, better trained, more dedicated or more ably led group of fighting forces than the men that we have in Vietnam, but they're up against enormous and, I think, overwhelming odds, because of the terrain of that country, because most of natural advantages are with the Vietcong; they're so elusive, they're so intermingled with the civilian population, which supposedly we're trying to win over to our side, that if we were to destroy the Vietcong, we'd have to destroy a large part of the civilian population in the process.

So it seems to me that the most practical goal that we can hope for is to hold the line, and then press very hard, which I think we're now doing, for some kind of a peaceful settlement.

Mr. VANOCUR. Well, Senator, as a former distinguished bomber pilot in World War II, one of your objectives was to talk to the bomber pilots in Vietnam. Did you get any impression that the bombings had done what they were supposed to do when they were started last winter?

Senator MCGOVERN. Well, I'm not sure that I know what all the objectives of the bombing policy have been. If those attacks were designed to stop the flow of manpower from North Vietnam into South Vietnam, they've failed, because we have many more men from the North fighting on behalf of the Vietcong in the South today than we did when the bombing attacks started last February. If the bombing was designed to encourage North Vietnam to come to the negotiating table, I'm not sure that that has been achieved; it may be that it had just the opposite effect, that it tended to produce a more rigid situation than what might otherwise have been the case.

But what disturbs me most of all is that no matter how careful our pilots are about the bombing attacks—and these are truly superb pilots—in a situation like this, you're bound to kill many innocent civilians. I'm talking now, not about the bombing in the north, but in the south, where supposedly the people or at least a large percentage of them are on our side. I was told that we exercise great caution in bombing villages and hamlets, but nevertheless, while I was there, in visiting the civilian hospitals in South Vietnam, I found them crowded with bombing victims, with little children with their legs, arms blown off; men, women and children with their faces and their bodies horribly burned and scarred with napalm bombs; those things, it seems to me, are inevitable in bombing attacks of this kind.

Mr. VANOCUR. But Senator, how can you possibly come to negotiations now, given the present attitude of the north and the National Liberation Front?

Senator MCGOVERN. Well, I think it's going to be difficult to get the other side to the conference table, but I don't think the differences that have been spelled out, either by them or by our leaders, are insurmountable. Now, as I understand it, both sides have given some rather strong indications that the terms of the original Geneva settlement, going back to 1954, are for the most part acceptable. We may have some difference of opinion as to how those Geneva terms should be interpreted. My understanding is that the other side is saying that there must not only be an eventual troop withdrawal, which we have accepted on principle; there also must be a coalition government formed in South Vietnam on a provisional basis until elections can be held, and that the Vietcong, or the National Liberation Front, would have to be a part of any such coalition government.

I think these are negotiable terms. We don't have to accept everything that has been proposed by the other side, but at least I think we could go into the conference room willing to discuss a settlement, pretty much along the lines of the original Geneva accord.

Mr. VANOCUR. But sir, the four points of Pham Van Dong, of April 8, the North Vietnamese premier, said on the third point that they had to accept the program of the National Liberation Front. Now, are you suggesting that we have to accept the National Liberation Front's program, or a coalition government?

Senator McGOVERN. Well, as Secretary Rusk has said, their position is somewhat ambiguous. It's not entirely clear just what they mean by the program of the National Liberation Front, and of course, that's the purpose of negotiations, to clear up the ambiguities and the uncertainties in the positions offered by the two sides. For my own part, I don't see how we can hope, realistically, to exclude the National Liberation Front entirely from the postwar settlement. After all, whether we like it or not—and of course we don't like it—they control probably two-thirds of the terrain in South Vietnam, and they control somewhere between a third and perhaps as much as a half of the people, and so a force of that kind is going to have to be given consideration, both in the negotiations and in the eventual settlement.

Mr. VANOCUR. Well, what are you going to do about people like Premier Ky in South Vietnam, who now seem to want to fight on to the end?

Senator McGOVERN. Well, I think that's one of the principal flaws, perhaps the basic flaw in our current negotiating effort and in previous efforts, is that those efforts have excluded the two primary antagonists in this struggle, and that's General Ky's government in Saigon and the National Liberation Front, the Vietcong guerrillas, the Vietcong rebels, whatever you want to call them.

Now, this war began in South Vietnam as a struggle between the government which we were backing in Saigon and another group of South Vietnamese that have formed under the National Liberation Front, which does not accept the government that we've been supporting. It was basically a civil and local conflict. So, I think we could greatly improve the chances for success in our current negotiating efforts, if those efforts included General Ky, or whoever happens to be in power in Saigon when negotiations get under way, and the National Liberation Front.

For us to insist that we can't have any dealings with the Vietcong, with the so-called National Liberation Front, would have its parallel, it seems to me, if 200 years ago, King George had said to the American Revolutionists or to George Washington, we'll talk to the French but we're not going to talk to Washington and the American rebels. Sooner or later, these two primary contestants to this struggle have to be brought into the negotiations.

Mr. VANOCUR. Well, Senator, if the present peace offensive does not bear public results, would you be in favor of resuming the bombings and taking the offensive again once more in the field?

Senator McGOVERN. No; I would not. I don't think it's in our interest to renew the bombing attacks or to spread this war in any way. I think we may have reached a situation of stalemate, whereby neither side can score a decisive victory. I've been trying to think of some analogy to the military and political situation that confronts us there, and the other day I—it occurred to me that it's very much like putting a bumblebee in a cage with an elephant. We have the power of the elephant—we have the air power, we have naval power, we have great

power on the ground, great firepower, and we're not going to be pushed out of Vietnam; I don't see any way by which the other side can push us out militarily. But by the same token, they're in the role of the bumblebee. They can continue to harass and to sting and to draw blood, but they can't push us out. If we could catch them—if we could find them, and bring that firepower to bear on the Vietcong guerrillas, we could quickly stamp them out, but it doesn't seem that that's about to happen.

Well, I hope we'll take advantage of what I think is approaching, a stalemate not to spread the war, not to start bombing North Vietnam or bombing Cambodia or bombing other countries in the area, but try to localize this struggle and hold it down to the battleground in South Vietnam, and I think the President was very wise in the bombing pause; I hope it'll be more than just a very brief pause.

Mr. VANOCUR. Senator, one last question. If this does not work out the way you would like it to, and more money is asked by the administration to support a wider war, what is going to be your position in the U.S. Senate?

Senator McGOVERN. Well, I'm not sure how I'll respond to that. I think as long as we have forces committed to Vietnam, we have to see that they're well equipped and that they have the resources that they need, but that's a decision I'll have to face up to when we're confronted with it.

Mr. VANOCUR. Thank you very, very much Senator GEORGE McGOVERN, Democrat, of South Dakota, who was out in Vietnam in November and early December, and who will be one of the voices heard in the forthcoming debate on Vietnam in the Congress.

Mr. MURKIN. Thank you, Senator, and thank you, Sander Vanocur, Today's Washington correspondent.

[From the New York Times, Jan. 6, 1966]

A VIETCONG PLACE AT PALEY URGED—McGOVERN WANTS SAIGON AT PEACE TALKS ALSO

(By E. W. Kenworthy)

WASHINGTON, January 5.—Senator GEORGE McGOVERN said today the "basic weakness" in U.S. efforts to negotiate a Vietnam settlement was the exclusion of the primary antagonists—the South Vietnamese Government and the rebel National Liberation Front.

The South Dakota Democrat, who recently returned from a week in South Vietnam, said:

"This war began as a local conflict in South Vietnam and that is still the primary battleground, no matter how many major powers feel called upon to gamble their national honor on Premier Nguyen Cao Ky of South Vietnam or Ho Chi Minh, President of North Vietnam."

Since the fundamental issue in the war is the political question which group will exercise power in South Vietnam, Senator McGOVERN said in a statement, "the negotiations ought to be primarily between the two competing groups in South Vietnam."

SENATOR CHURCH AGREES

Mr. McGOVERN's views are shared by several Senators who have been critical of the escalation of the war.

One of these, Senator FRANK CHURCH, Democrat, of Idaho, said in an interview that Senator McGOVERN's proposal "makes sense."

"The United States, can back Saigon at the negotiating table as Hanoi can back the Vietcong," Mr. CHURCH said, "but neither the American Government nor the Government of North Vietnam can end a revolution in South Vietnam without the participation and consent of those who engaged in it."

President Johnson has said that "the Vietcong would not have difficulty being represented (in negotiations) and having their views represented."

Presumably he meant by this that representatives of the National Liberation Front, of which the Vietcong is the military arm, could be included in North Vietnam's delegation.

The United States has refused to deal directly with the National Liberation Front, to assure it a place in a future South Vietnamese Government or to recognize its military hold on roughly one-third of South Vietnam.

One of North Vietnam's conditions for peace is that the Liberation Front have a role in any new government before elections are held in South Vietnam. Washington finds this condition unacceptable.

As for Premier Ky, he has set his face against any negotiations.

MOVE TO END IMPASSE URGED

Senator McGOVERN sought today to cut through all these entrenched positions by asking all the parties to face up to the realities of the situation.

"It makes no sense at all," he said in a statement, "for us to try to bomb North Vietnam into negotiations or to talk them into negotiations unless our South Vietnamese allies and the rebel forces in South Vietnam are ready to negotiate a settlement."

"The most logical way for the South Vietnamese Government leaders to assist in ending the war would be to explore the possible basis for a settlement with their fellow Vietnamese in the National Liberation Front."

The Liberation Front leaders, he said, are "determined proud men," who could be expected not to let Moscow, Peking, or Hanoi do their negotiating for them. On the other hand, he said, they could not be expected to accept a settlement that did not give them "a proportionate share in the postwar government."

Senator McGOVERN had previously urged a halt to U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and a negotiated settlement of the war. His statement today indicated that the pause in the bombing and efforts to start negotiations had not convinced him that the United States was doing enough to obtain peace.

Senator EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Democrat, of Maine, who accompanied Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, the Democratic leader of the Senate, on a globe-circling trip that included Vietnam, did not agree with Mr. McGOVERN's recommendations. Reached by telephone, he said he doubted whether the National Liberation Front was independent of North Vietnamese control.

Senator RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Democrat, of Georgia, and chairman of the Armed Services Committee, said in an interview that the pause in the air bombing of North Vietnam had gone on too long.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR GEORGE McGOVERN, DEMOCRAT, OF SOUTH DAKOTA

(NOTE.—Senator GEORGE McGOVERN, a member of the Committees on Agriculture and Interior and former Director of the U.S. food for peace program (1961-62) visited Vietnam in early December.)

A basic weakness in the current efforts to negotiate a settlement of the Vietnamese war is that those efforts seem to have excluded the two primary antagonists in the struggle—the South Vietnamese Government in Saigon and the National Liberation Front of the Vietcong rebel forces.

I appreciate President Johnson's great desire to end the war. But the chances of negotiations taking place could be greatly improved if the two principal contestants were involved in the negotiating effort.

The fundamental issue at stake in this war is a local political question as to which group will come to power in South Vietnam. I doubt that an issue of that kind will be resolved by military forces from the outside.

But negotiations should include the two competing groups in South Vietnam—the Vietcong National Liberation Front and

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General Ky or whoever happens to be in power in Saigon when the negotiations begin.

It makes no sense at all for us to try to bomb North Vietnam into negotiations or to talk them into negotiations unless our South Vietnamese ally and the rebel forces in South Vietnam are ready to negotiate a settlement.

It is disturbing that while President Johnson has been trying to get negotiations started, General Ky, our South Vietnamese ally, has expressed his opposition to negotiations.

The most logical way for the South Vietnamese Government leaders to assist in ending the war would be to explore the possible basis for a settlement with their fellow Vietnamese in the National Liberation Front.

This war began as a local conflict in South Vietnam and that is still the primary battleground no matter how many major powers feel called upon to gamble their national honor on General Ky or Uncle Ho.

It will be difficult, if not impossible, to end the war without discussions with the Vietcong rebel leaders as well as Hanoi and Saigon.

The rebels control two-thirds of South Vietnam and their leadership front embraces a broad cross section including many non-Communists. They cannot be expected to permit Moscow, Peking, Hanoi or anyone else to do their negotiating for them.

Nor can they be expected to accept any settlement that does not give them a reasonable opportunity to share in the postwar government—a government which ultimately should be determined by the Vietnamese people in an honorably supervised election.

Refusing to negotiate with the rebel front would have its parallel if King George III had expressed a willingness to negotiate with France while refusing to talk with George Washington and his rebel forces.

The most realistic way to achieve a settlement between Saigon and the local rebel forces, is for the outside powers to begin reducing their involvement on a reciprocal basis so that the struggle can be confined to a local rather than a global struggle.

President Johnson took a long stride toward localizing the war when he stopped the bombing of North Vietnam. Let us hope that our commanders will not be so foolish as to extend the bombing to Cambodia or other countries. I believe that the Russians and the Chinese, while giving some assistance to Hanoi, have limited their interference in the struggle because, no matter how beligerently they talk, they know it is no more in their interest than in ours to blow this local issue into a global war. The major powers ought to search for every possible way of confining the struggle to South Vietnam. There is no issue there that can possibly be of enough importance to justify a major war between the great powers.

Indeed, for the United States and the other major powers to waste their resources and their young men in a global slaughter over who is to be in charge in Saigon would be to create the conditions of chaos out of which could come a hundred Vietnam tragedies to curse our children for all their days.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

READING OF WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS

The VICE PRESIDENT. Pursuant to the order of the Senate of January 24, 1961, the Chair appoints the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF] to read Washington's Farewell Address on February 22 next. It is the understanding of the Chair that the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF] will be the only man who has read this famous address in both the House and the Senate.

PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE WITH MEXICO

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair announces the appointment of the fol-

lowing Senators to attend the meeting of the Mexico-United States Interparliamentary meeting to be held February 9 through 16, 1966, at Washington, Philadelphia, and San Francisco: Senators MANSFIELD, GRUENING, METCALF, NELSON, MONTOYA, KUCHEL, FANNIN, and MURPHY.

These Senators will serve along with Senator SPARKMAN, who is the chairman of the delegation, and Senators MORSE, GORE, and AIKEN. The last four mentioned Senators will serve for the full Congress.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL MONDAY

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate adjourn until 12 o'clock noon, on Monday next.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 5 o'clock and 50 minutes) the Senate adjourned, under the previous order, until Monday, January 24, 1966, at 12 o'clock meridian.

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate January 20, 1966:

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

William Gorham, of the District of Columbia, to be an Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, to which office he was appointed during the last recess of the Senate.

U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION

Paul Kaplowitz, of the District of Columbia, to be a member of the U.S. Tariff Commission for the term expiring June 16, 1967.

House of Representatives

THURSDAY, JANUARY 20, 1966

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Bernard Braskamp, D.D., used this verse of Scripture: *Thy hands have made me and fashioned me; give me understanding that I may learn Thy commandments.*

Eternal God, who art the help and hope in the thought and work of our days, be Thou our joy and consolation as we bring to Thee the nameless needs of our minds and hearts.

Keep us strong and steadfast as we bow in weakness, in sorrow, in temptation, in depression of soul and open to us the word of truth and break to us the bread of life.

Grant that in following Thee we may find the highest wisdom, the deepest delight, the sum of the duty and discipline of life, the ideal of its dedication, however complete and compelling its demands may be.

May the witness and testimony which we give to life be one of lofty faith, heroic character, and fruitful service and all for Thy glory in Christ's name. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States was communicated to the House by Mr. Geisler, one of his secretaries.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Arrington, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment a joint resolution of the House of the following title:

H.J. Res. 767. Joint resolution authorizing the President to proclaim National Ski Week.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed, with amendments in which the concurrence of the House is requested, a bill of the House of the following title:

H.R. 30. An act to provide for participation of the United States in the Inter-American Cultural and Trade Center in Dade County, Fla., and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed a bill of the following title, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 1446. An act to reserve certain public lands for a National Wild Rivers System, to provide a procedure for adding additional public lands and other lands to the system, and for other purposes.

FOUR-YEAR TERM FOR MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

(Mr. CORMAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CORMAN. Mr. Speaker, there is a clear and pressing need for an amendment to the Constitution extending the terms of Members of the House of Representatives from 2 to 4 years.

It is true that the original purpose of limiting the term of Representatives to 2 years was to keep them close to the people and assure responsiveness to the people's will. It was felt that if a Representative failed to measure up to what was expected of him, 2 years in office were enough.

The 2-year limitation, however, cuts both ways, and on balance I think that today it does far more harm than good.

As we all know from our own experience, it takes time for the House to be reorganized at the beginning of a session. It takes time for even a highly qualified freshman Member to learn the ropes if he is to contribute to the work of Congress and the needs of his constituents. Yet, whether he is new or a veteran, every Congressman must immediately begin giving extended thought and time to his next campaign. And he must be prepared to spend a considerable amount of time at home, even during a legislative session.

Such conditions are scarcely conducive for a Member to do his best work on matters before the Congress.

When the Nation was founded, economic and social conditions were relatively uncomplicated. Today, legislation requires careful study and a high degree of skill in drafting legislation, writing reports, and conducting hearings. In an age marked by continuing crisis, 2 years is barely time enough to learn the job. The time has come to extend the term of Representatives to 4 years.

It is my opinion, also, that, if any elections are to be eliminated, it should be the off-year elections. The election of a President and the Members of the House for a concurrent term of 4 years, as President Johnson proposes, will help to insure that the mandate of the people is carried out by the new administration.

I urge the adoption of this amendment in the form suggested by the President.

AIRLIFT OF MAIL FOR U.S. PERSONNEL OVERSEAS

(Mr. DULSKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1

minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DULSKI. Mr. Speaker, several members of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee visited the European area during November and December last year, and one of the main purposes of our visit was to obtain on-site information concerning the operation of the U.S. Armed Forces postal service. The delegation was unanimous in its belief that legislative action should be scheduled immediately on legislation authorizing the airlift of priority mail to U.S. personnel stationed overseas.

I have today introduced legislation to carry out this recommendation. I will press for immediate consideration of this legislation before our committee.

The primary purpose of this legislation is to provide transportation by air of certain types of mail between the United States and Armed Forces post offices overseas.

The first section amends section 4169 (a) of title 39, United States Code, to remove the requirement that mail from a serviceman in a combat area, which is sent at no cost to the sender, be sent as "airmail." Airmail classification requires a higher rate of transportation than would be required under the proposed new authorization to transport all letter mail by air. This change would remove the requirement that the mail be transported by air inside the continental United States.

Section 2 rewrites paragraph (5) of 39 U.S.C. 4303(d), to provide new authority for transportation by air between the United States and the overseas military post offices when the mail is classified as: First, first-class letter mail; second, second-class publications having current news value; and third, fourth-class parcels not exceeding 5 pounds in weight and 60 inches in length and girth combined.

This legislation applies to any individual, military or civilian, receiving or sending mail at an Armed Forces post office overseas. The regular rate of postage for surface transportation will be required in all cases.

FOUR-YEAR TERM FOR MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

(Mr. WHITENER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WHITENER. Mr. Speaker and my colleagues, when our Founding Fathers wrote our Constitution, they provided that Members of the House of

In an equal era of evolution on the Rhode Island scene—that will forever bear the label of our beloved Theodore Francis Green and Robert E. Quinn—Frank Condon made the sacrifice of turning his back on the broad page of national history to write the bright page of history which is the record of the Rhode Island Supreme Court in his time.

Only in terms of political opportunity would I say "sacrifice." To Frank Condon it was no sacrifice to come back to this high service to the State of his birth.

He has touched these 30 years with a courageous, correct and courteous application of justice and humanity, unsurpassed in equity and integrity.

No one knows this better than a young prosecuting attorney, no one appreciates it more than a Governor leaning upon him amid the anxieties of office. No one is prouder of it than a Senator who rejoices in his own State's excellence among constitutional equals.

This may be grand language to describe a man whose own language was simple and sincere, whether in his eloquence to an enraptured audience or in his quiet encouragement to a friend. A call, a message, a handclasp, a bit of spoken praise from Frank Condon was high satisfaction and inspiration.

The honors that came to him from his church were splendid. The honors that came from his people were sacred. The shadow that falls on his loved ones is our common sorrow.

A great American and a good man leaves us all the heritage of a life lived to its finest.

VIETNAM PAST AND PROSPECT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in a series of four newspaper articles, Miss Beverly Deepe has recently reviewed the war as it has evolved in Vietnam during the past year. Miss Deepe is eminently qualified by experience to report on this critical area.

Miss Deepe writes from Vietnam, from the delta, from Saigon, from the coastal bases, from the highlands. And the picture which emerges from the four articles is a vivid and accurate summary of the situation which confronts us in Vietnam.

These articles, Mr. President, make highly informative and highly useful reading. For the benefit of the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that the four articles which appeared in the New York Herald Tribune, in the issues of January 16-19 inclusive be included at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Jan. 16, 1966]

NEW SERIES: VIETNAM, PAST AND PROSPECT
(By Beverly Deepe)

PLEIKU, SOUTH VIETNAM.—Amid mortar craters and charred aircraft here on the morning of February 7, 1965, three figures in the war against the Communist in South Vietnam met in a gleaming C-123 transport. Before they emerged, the nature of the war had changed.

One was McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to President Johnson for national security affairs, who took time before the meeting to survey Pleiku's blasted airplanes and helicopters and the billets where shortly before 8 Americans had died and 125 had been wounded in a Vietcong guerrilla raid.

With Mr. Bundy was Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the American commander, who provided the C-123, called the White

Whale and the only wall-to-wall carpeted airplane in South Vietnam.

The Vietnamese commander in chief, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, had arrived earlier. Meanwhile, in Saigon U.S. Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor conferred by telephone with the highest ranking American officials in Washington.

General Khanh, Mr. Bundy, and General Westmoreland escaped inquisitive reporters inside the White Whale. Soon, the key decision was told to General Khanh and within hours 49 U.S. planes from three 7th Fleet aircraft carriers sped north of the 17th parallel to bomb the military barracks at the North Vietnamese city of Dong Hoi.

At first, the bombing of North Vietnam was a policy of tit for tat—if you destroy our installations, we'll destroy yours. But it soon gave way to general retaliation, and then to regular and continual bombing. In the beginning, the policy was officially proclaimed an inducement to the north to negotiate. High ranking American officials said hopefully: "We'll be at the conference table by September."

But Hanoi did not negotiate. The new official objective was to hit the military installations and the communication routes which allowed Hanoi to pour men and materiel into South Vietnam. By the year's end, however, official estimates said North Vietnamese infiltration had more than doubled—to 2,500 men a month.

Superficially, bombing North Vietnam failed. It did not force Hanoi to negotiate; it did not stop the infiltration. But actually, the policy half succeeded. By the end of the year, the bombing had partially paralyzed the economic capacity and manpower reserves of North Vietnam.

If the bombing did not stop Hanoi's aggression, in official eyes, it would at least make it more expensive and painful for North Vietnam to continue. Escalation was accompanied by a little noticed policy of expansion, Laos was known to be subject to American bombing raids throughout the past year. By the beginning of 1966, the air war threatened to spread to Cambodia, and then would engulf the whole Indochinese Peninsula.

GROUND WAR

The air war over North Vietnam, however, did not abate sharp deterioration in the allied ground efforts in South Vietnam, which had been worsening since the fall of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in November 1963. The repercussions of the coup against Diem badly damaged the Government's administrative and intelligence apparatuses. Amid Government instability in Saigon swirled whirlwind changes of officials at every level. The strategic hamlet program, formulated and nurtured by the Diem regime, collapsed as the Vietcong regained one Government hamlet after another, leaving behind their own guerrilla bands and political machinery.

With some accuracy the situation in the countryside could be measured by statistics. Before the fall of Diem, the Saigon government claimed control of 8,000 of the 12,000 hamlets in the countryside. By the end of 1965, the most optimistic estimate put the number of "pacified," or pro-government, hamlets at 2,000.

After the fall of Diem, military commanders quickly began to change their "measle" maps. Pink contested areas became red; and white "measle pox"—which once had been government controlled—became contested "pink." By the middle of 1965, government provincial capitals and district headquarters were ringed by small oases of friendly villages, but otherwise were isolated by increasing Red pressure in the countryside. Then, in July 1964, the first North Vietnamese regular troops began appearing. These units, later to be designated as People's Army of North Vietnam (PAVN), solidified the growing Red strength.

By the end of 1965, military spokesmen said nine PAVN regiments had infiltrated from North Vietnam, (American, Korean, and Australian ground units by late 1965 numbered 44 battalions—or roughly 15 regiments.)

On March 8, 1965, the first 3,500 U.S. Marines came ashore and were welcomed by a bevy of girls.

The American and allied buildup continued throughout the year. It came part of the 3d Marine Division, and later the whole division, a brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, elements of the 1st Marine Division, the Republic of Korea's Tiger Regiment and Marine Division, an Australian regiment, and finally the entire U.S. 1st Cavalry Airmobile Division, with its more than 400 helicopters and 15,000 troops, many of them airborne. By the end of the year, American combat military personnel numbered 130,000. The outlook for 1966: the equivalent of at least 1 division a month for 12 months, or nearly 200,000 more troops.

MARINES

The 1st Marines officially were to provide "local, close-in security" for the Da Nang airbase, but soon they began what U.S. spokesmen called "offensive patrolling for defensive purposes." By mid-July, American troops went into unequivocal full combat with Communist forces for the first time since the Korean war—as the 173d Airborne Brigade went out on a search-and-destroy operation in the Red stronghold known as D-Zone.

With the new employment of ground and air forces, the U.S. role went through gradual metamorphosis. At the end of 1965 America was in a war it barely realized it had entered. The cold war had gone hot in the jungles of the Indochinese peninsula.

Beyond the ideological conflict, the war dramatized and tested two systems of power. One, the massive physical power of America; the other, the power of the Communists to manipulate the masses, to incite uprisings labeled by the Chinese Communists as the "war of liberation." Washington and Peking appeared to agree it was the "war of the future."

The essence of the war was described by a 20-year-old American private who saw the buildup in Da Nang:

"I can tell you when Uncle Sam moves in, there's no goofing around," he said. "There was nothing here. Then the Marines moved in and the buildings started going up. We got word an F-100 squadron was moving in here and we had 4 days to fill 200,000 bags of dirt to sandbag mortar defenses. Even the colonels were shoveling dirt.

"Now you can look down this runway and for 2 miles there are American jets wing tip to wing tip," he said. "That's real power."

The private, who had sat 14 hours a day for 13 months in a foxhole at the edge of the Da Nang runway, turned to the other side of the war.

INTELLIGENCE

"The Vietcong know more about what's happening on this airbase than the base commander and the 20,000 American Marines around it," he said. "There are 6,000 workers who come on here daily. We know some of them are Vietcong. If the Vietnamese security officer keeps them off, he and his family will be killed.

"The Vietcong can come on this base right under our noses—we don't know who's who. We saw an old woman carrying a bucket of drain oil into the gate. When we checked her, there was only an inch of oil and the rest of the bucket was a false bottom filled with plastic explosive. We captured one of the workers drawing diagrams of all the defense structures on the base. We captured one of the drivers of an American bus taking down the tail numbers of all the American aircraft on the base," the private went on.

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I take this opportunity to commend Mr. Vaughn for the outstanding job he has done as Assistant Secretary during a very difficult period in United States-Latin American relations. He brings to his new post a wealth of experience and understanding drawn from an outstanding academic background, a long association with our foreign aid program, as organizer of the Latin American programs for the Peace Corps, as Ambassador to Panama, and as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs since April 1964.

I know Secretary Vaughn personally and find him to be a dedicated public servant of great ability, charm, and dedication. As Assistant Secretary he worked with great dedication to strengthen American relations with our Latin American neighbors during a very critical period following the eruption of the Dominican crisis, and worked hard to strengthen our common bonds through the Alliance for Progress.

I am pleased that the Peace Corps, such a vital and important element in our foreign relations, will be in the hands of such an effective director.

DEATH OF CHIEF JUSTICE FRANCIS B. CONDON, OF THE SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, on November 23, 1965, Francis B. Condon, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Rhode Island passed away.

Frank Condon was a man of the common people with uncommon gifts and tremendous contributions to the betterment of his times.

A jurist of superlative attainments—a public servant whose lifetime encompassed multiple careers, a citizen held in the highest respect, a layman devoted to his faith and honored by that faith, a friend of infinite value—was Frank Condon.

We note his passing in these Halls because he was Congressman Condon of the 71st, 72d, 73d, and 74th Congresses. So—30 years ago—he had already achieved a name and place in history.

Thirty years ago Frank Condon had to make a choice and face a challenge. He was called upon to forsake one career and follow another. He loved the hustings, he relished the halls of legislation, he could have looked forward to future honors without limit on the national scene. He found himself drafted by his native State to return to serve upon that State's supreme court.

Let me note Frank Condon's career to that point—and I take it from our Congressional Directory of the American Congresses.

Francis Bernard Condon, a Representative from Rhode Island, born in Central Falls, Providence County, R.I., November 11, 1891; attended the public schools; was graduated from Central Falls High School in 1910 and from Georgetown University Law School, Washington, D.C., in 1916.

He was admitted to the bar in 1916 and commenced practice in Pawtucket, R.I. During the First World War he served as a sergeant in the 152d Regiment, Depot Brigade, 23d Company from May 1918 to June 1919; he was a member of the State house of repre-

sentatives 1921–1926, serving as Democratic floor leader 1923–1926; he was a member of the Democratic State Committee 1924–1926 and 1928–1930, serving as a member of the executive committee 1928–1930; he was a candidate for Lieutenant Governor of Rhode Island in 1928; Rhode Island department commander of the American Legion in 1927 and 1928; elected as a Democrat to the 71st Congress to fill a vacancy and at the same time elected to the 72d Congress; reelected to the 73d and 74th Congresses and served from November 4, 1930 until his resignation on January 10, 1935, having been appointed an associate justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court in which capacity he is now serving.

Now let us pick up the chapter of these 30 years from Justice Condon's biography in the Manual of the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island:

Francis B. Condon was associate justice of the supreme court from January 1935 to April 28, 1957—acting chief justice of the supreme court from April 28, 1957, to January 7, 1958. Has been chief justice since January 7, 1958, chairman of the Rhode Island Judicial Conference. Member of the American, Rhode Island and Pawtucket Bar Associations and the American Judicature Society.

He received the Georgetown University John Carroll Award 1961; Mount Saint Mary's College (I.L.D.) honorary; Providence College (I.L.D.) University of Rhode Island (I.L.D.). Trustee of the boys club and memorial hospital, Pawtucket; Knight Commander of the Order of St. Gregory the Great with Star by appointment of Pope John XXIII, 1961.

I would add the accolade of his faith, the Catholic Church speaking through the Providence Visitor, the voice of the Diocese of Providence:

Chief Justice Francis B. Condon was one of the State's outstanding laymen. Honored many times, he was a motivating factor in diocesan affairs at the lay level. Long active in annual diocesan Catholic charity fund appeals, he will be remembered for his addresses to the clergy and outstanding businessmen at the kickoff meetings of the campaign drives. He was a former trustee of Holy Trinity Church, Central Falls, a trustee of St. Teresa's Church, Pawtucket.

His affiliations included American Legion, Elks, Knights of Columbus, Ancient Order of Hibernians, National Conference of Chief Justices, the Serra Club of Providence, the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick, and the Sons of Irish Kings.

A son of Dennis Gerald Condon and Rose (Collette) Condon he was married to the former Lillian F. Jordan. Surviving in addition to Mrs. Condon are their children, Francis B. Condon, Jr., and Miss Rae B. Condon, a brother James Condon, two sisters, Miss Mary G. Condon and Mrs. John Quinn, a nephew Edward Condon M. M. and a niece Sister Mary Francis of the American Novitiate of Franciscan Sisters of Mary.

We have the tribute of the Rhode Island Bar Association speaking through its president, William R. Goldberg:

It is with profound sorrow that we note the passing of our fellow member, Chief Justice Francis B. Condon.

From the start his consideration for the lawyers, his keen attention to their arguments, and his incisive questions and logic gained the respect of all. His opinions were written with great care and will serve as a living memorial to him in our jurisprudence for all time.

Upon his elevation in 1958 to Chief Justice of the Court his recognition of the problems of the lawyer whose client pressed him for prompt consideration of his cause, together

with his concern for the litigants, brought about an acceleration of the Court's activity to such an extent that with the help of the entire Court as constituted from time to time, the decisions have been handed down at a pace that has been unprecedented in the history of the Court.

He was keenly aware of the problems of the young lawyer and after careful consideration, our Supreme Court amended its rule requiring a 6 months' clerkship by reducing it to 3 months.

His devotion and love for his family was equaled only by his love of country. Judge Condon's views of the sanctity of the home and the rights of the individual are reflected in his opinions time and again.

Not only has his family lost a beloved and devoted father and husband and our State lost a great and wise chief of its judicial branch of the Government but we, members of the bar, have lost a brother devoted to all mankind.

Such has been the life and labors of Frank Condon in the three decades since he served on this Capitol Hill.

There are among us those of his colleagues of that day who carry on to this day. And one can only ponder on the part that the magnificent mind and powerful personality of Frank Condon might still be playing in the drama of our daily labors.

Consider who were his colleagues in the House, and the inspiration they might have given, and taken.

There were LISTER HILL, JOHN MCCALLAN, EVERETT DIRKSEN, FRANK CARLSON, JOHN MCCORMACK, JOE MARTIN, JENNINGS RANDOLPH, WILLIS ROBERTSON, STEVE YOUNG, Sterling Cole, EMANUEL CELLER, James Wadsworth, Jr., Fiorello La Guardia, Sam Rayburn and Tom Hennings were there. There was Richard M. Kleberg who had for his secretary a young Texan named Lyndon B. Johnson.

Much of this was in my mind as I was invited to participate in a special memorial service on November 29, 1965, in the Supreme Court of Rhode Island and I would conclude with the eulogy I was privileged to express for my dear friend and associate, Justice Condon on that occasion.

EULOGY DELIVERED BY SENATOR JOHN O. PASTORE AT MEMORIAL SERVICES IN TRIBUTE TO CHIEF JUSTICE FRANCIS B. CONDON, IN RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CHAMBERS, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1965

In this setting we are a little lonely for the personality who lived and labored here for 30 mortal years.

And, with all our faith in immortality, there is a sense of loss, of the victory of the grave, to realize that Francis Condon—to whom this scene meant so much, to whom this scene owed so much—moves among us no more.

Great of mind, great of heart, greatest of soul was this kindly man it was a privilege to know and an honor to call friend.

Chief justice of the State of his total loyalty, Frank Condon could well have worn an equal title of the country that he served so well as citizen, as soldier, and statesman.

For Frank Condon went to Congress schooled with the experience of the Rhode Island General Assembly in historic days. Gifted of speech, skilled parliamentarian, with rare attractions of friendship, he was baptized in an era of evolution on our national scene that will ever bear the name of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. There is no honor or office in the gift of all our people that could not have been his.

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"Once my unit was given 5 hours of leave to go to the commissary. When we returned, more than half of the 100 American foxholes around the base had small paper bags in them. Each bag had a poisonous krait snake in it. Some worker had just walked around and dropped a snake in each foxhole."

This conflict of the two systems of power—the old woman with a bucket of explosive and the double-the-speed-of sound Phantom jets—was the essence of America's inscrutable war, which one Western diplomat described as "the unholy trinity of terrorism, subversion, and guerrilla warfare."

America's inscrutable war in Vietnam had brush-fired into another area of the volatile, underdeveloped, uncommitted third world.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Jan. 17, 1966]

VIETNAM: PAST AND PROSPECT—SOUTH VIETS IDENTIFY GI'S WITH COLONIALISM

(By Beverly Deepe)

SAIGON.—The buildup of American combat troops in Vietnam during 1965 produced a visible buildup in anti-Americanism among the Vietnamese population.

A significant date between the February 7 bombing of North Vietnam and the March 8 arrival of the first American combat units was the February 20 mutiny against Commander-in-Chief Gen. Nguyen Khanh by his generals. The net effect of General Khanh's overthrow was to fragment the anti-Communist power in Saigon, while the Vietcong had seized partial control of the country at the village level.

As commander in chief, a more important post in wartime than that of Prime Minister, General Khanh had dominated the anti-Communist scene—and had been acclaimed by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara as America's strongman for Vietnam. But by late 1964, General Khanh grew bitter toward U.S. Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor, who demanded political stability, while General Khanh was aspiring to the presidency.

FALSE COUP

Twelve days after the bombing of North Vietnam, a false coup was led by Col. Pham Ngoc Thao, who was openly acknowledged to be associated with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The next day the generals forced General Khanh out of the country. The 600,000-man Vietnamese armed forces were turned over to a weak commander in chief. Finally, the post was abolished, leaving the armed forces virtually leaderless.

Prime Minister Phan Huy Quat ran into trouble. After 3 months in office he called for support from the Vietnamese generals, who promptly tossed him out of office. A Vietnamese military junta again took on the job of governing the country while attempting to defeat an enemy.

Amid instability on the anti-Communist side, the Reds could exploit the first American combat units—who arrived without solid political, economic, or social battle plans. The instincts of the Vietnamese, traditionally xenophobic, were to identify the American troops with the former French colonial masters. Better political and economic preparation of the American troops would have eased the situation considerably.

It was widely known in Saigon that the Vietnamese—including Prime Minister Phan Huy Quat—learned of the date of the arrival of the first Marines in March from foreign press announcements made in Saigon and Washington. The Vietnamese feared they might win the war but lose their country. Outbursts from officers, students, and intellectuals charged that "the Americans were running the whole show."

THE DOLLAR

No sooner did the American troops land in the northern provinces than the medium

of exchange became the U.S. dollar rather than the plaster. With no restrictions on the amount of available dollars, an American private had purchasing power once held only by Vietnamese generals. Cokes, beers, and wash basins were purchased in villages with nickels, dimes, and quarters. In at least one instance, a Vietnamese village chief, backed up by his popular force platoons, attempted to invade the village of another chief and to seize the villagers' American dollars at an unfair rate of exchange. Six months after the arrival of the first American units, American officials abolished the use of dollars in Vietnam. Replacing them was military scrip, which now has become another "floating currency."

The American troops quickly became the predominant possessors of one of the scarcest items in Vietnam. Women. Few Vietnamese appreciated the loss of their women—or the fact that illiterate females could earn 10 times a man's pay. Gradually, in any city or village bordering American units, drug-stores, villas, and furniture stores quickly gave way to bars and brothels.

WAGES

The buildup of American forces also brought demands for more housing, runways, offices, and other facilities. Wages for skilled labor, and cost of building materials and transportation brought inflation. "The Vietnamese economy is in horrific shape. This could ruin the whole campaign against the Vietcong," one Western diplomat said recently.

The Vietcong sabotage of roads had also produced inflation on items such as rice, charcoal, and fish sauce. The American economic mission reacted by importing consumer goods to sop up the excess purchasing power—and financed the emergency import of 250,000 tons of rice. While the Saigon price of rice dropped, in the provinces rich merchants continued to charge what the traffic would bear.

The Vietnamese hurt most by the inflation were not the Communists, but the government's own officials and troops, paid mostly on fixed salaries.

In the city of Da Nang, an average of three or four fistfights a week break out between GI's and teenage Vietnamese gangs, popularly known as "cowboys." One American serviceman was beaten up and lay in a back alley for 2 days. Though Vietnamese shopkeepers saw the body, they did not report it to police. The American military police finally located it.

By the beginning of 1966, it became apparent that the Buddhist bonzes, as well as the Vietcong, could easily exploit Vietnamese nationalism and anti-Americanism.

One incident used by the Buddhists occurred when the American marines fired two tank rifle rounds into a pagoda from which they claimed a sniper was firing at them. The word immediately spread among Vietnamese peasants that the marines had maliciously fired into the pagoda. The marines also were accused of having deliberately broken a Buddhist statue and strewn human excrement around the pagoda.

The Buddhists, widely considered to include neutralists and pro-Communists, previously had successfully toppled two administrations in Vietnam: President Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963, and General Khanh in August 1964.

"If the Buddhist priests do turn anti-American, the war will change into a new dimension which we can't even yet imagine," one source said, looking forward to 1966.

At the beginning of the year, rural Vietnam was half conquered by the Vietcong, and the urban portion was in a state of semi-insurrection. As more American troops arrived, resulting anti-Americanism vastly complicated the prospects for economic and political stability.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Jan. 18, 1966]

VIETNAM: PAST AND PROSPECT—SUBVERSION IN THE MEKONG DELTA

SA DEC, SOUTH VIETNAM.—Officially, the Mekong Delta south of Saigon—where no American combat units have yet been based—is one of the spots where the Vietnamese Government is progressing well. The simple tranquillity of fishing boats passing through canals, the hectic automobile traffic on the roads, the unbroken routine of peasant life would seem to confirm the official version.

But those who live in the villages say the Vietcong have seized virtual control of this rich rice bowl.

The process is not one of violent battles, but the invisible strangulation and isolation of government authority. It is a process of subversion which might be called termite warfare. Government authority has been squeezed into small rings of villages around provincial and district capitals, and into isolated outposts along the main roads and canals.

At Sa Dec is the headquarters of the Vietnamese 9th Infantry Division. Six miles away is the village complex of Nha Man. Two of its three villages are already controlled by the Communists. The third village, Tan Nhuan Dong, is protected by one company of about 100 paramilitary troops. An additional platoon is assigned to each of two smaller outposts—Ba Thien, 1 mile away, and Nga Ba, 2 miles off.

ENCIRCLED

The company at Tan Nhuan Dong lives in an old French fort. Its job is to protect the village and a bridge which stretches across a river flanked by several operating rice mills and brick factories.

The two outposts are encircled by Vietcong guerrillas. Last month they were totally isolated from the local population. To bring in supplies and support for these two posts, the government has to use 10 armored boats. On every voyage the boats and their complement of troops draw Communist sniper fire.

The platoons in each of the two small posts theoretically send out small, regular patrols to gather intelligence. They are called the "ears and eyes of the regular forces." But recently, a local villager described them as "blind men in a jail." For it is rare that a member of either platoon dares leave his compound, even to fetch water from the river 20 yards away.

Last week, one defender crossed the outpost's barbed wire fence for water. He was wounded by a sniper and fell on the river bank. No one dared rescue him. He died and his body was left on the same spot for three days. The commander asked headquarters for reinforcements, to pick up the body 20 yards away from his post. The request was refused.

The platoon was ordered to bury the corpse inside the post, but again the men refused to pick up the body. On repeated orders, they eventually brought in the corpse, but the outpost had no shovels, so they used knives to dig the grave. They had no lumber or nails, so they ripped wood from the walls of their outpost to make the coffin.

After the grotesque burial, morale was so low the company commander decided to transfer the platoon. The 100-man company ordered to relieve them refused to obey their transfer order and most of them defected to the Communists rather than man the Nga Ba outpost. Most returned after the province district chiefs were forced to visit the company of deserters, but the order to man the outpost was rescinded.

ISOLATION

The influence of the Communists goes, however, far beyond the terror built with sniper's bullets.

Last month, the Vietcong ordered peasants and businessmen working or living within a half mile of the Nga Ba outpost to move away. The word went out: No one was allowed to move inside the half mile limit. Rather than sail on the river 20 yards from the outposts, villagers' sampans were assigned to small canals.

One rice miller moved his mill brick-by-brick, machine-by-machine, to a new spot nearer government authority. One villager's reaction: "The Vietcong were very nice to give him the permission to move his rice mill. Otherwise, he would have starved to death. No one would have brought rice to him to be polished within the half mile radius of the post."

In monthly propaganda meetings with the villagers, Vietcong political agents claim "the Americans are waging an all-out war against the Vietnamese people. The people have to make a clear-cut choice between their friends and their enemies. Those who want to fight with the Americans can go to the government-controlled area. Those who want to fight against the Americans can stay with us. There is no third choice."

In Sa Dec, refugee villagers prefer to live in their sampans moored along the riverfront. They have refused to live in refugee housing provided by the government.

Many of the wealthier landowners already have been forced to flee to government-controlled zones, producing the effect of an economic purge of the area by the Communists. Their abandoned lands, especially fruit groves along the canals, have been boobytrapped and mined by Red guerrillas. The Vietcong have warned landowners that their lands will be confiscated if they allow their sons to become government soldiers.

The Vietcong forbid landowners to hire local labor, and terrorize potential workers—drying up the labor force from both ends. Once-wealthy landed proprietors must plant and harvest their own rice—backbreaking work.

VISITS HALTED

Within the last month, the Vietcong have withdrawn permission to local residents to visit friends or relatives in government-controlled areas. Even the father of one of the senior generals at the Vietnamese Army headquarters in Saigon—who previously had been allowed by the Vietcong to visit his son—now is forbidden to leave the Vietcong area.

But the Vietcong efforts are not all just onerous. They have established efficient—though unofficial and terroristic—taxation. Often using children as collectors, they force millers, small factory owners and businessmen to pay regular levies.

Peasants must turn over to the Reds 40 percent of the rice they grow above their own family's consumption. Any fish or grain grown in the Red-controlled area which is sent into government territory is taxed by the Vietcong—as if they maintained a national border.

So under the noses of government officials and a major army force, the Communists have established their own government in the Mekong Delta. It has almost eroded away the authority of the anti-Communist Saigon regime, and, perhaps more significantly, has taken major steps toward replacing it with an authority of their own.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Jan. 19, 1966]

VIETNAM: PAST AND PRESENT—MARINES' GREAT EFFORT: SECURING DA NANG
(By Beverly Decepe)

DA NANG, SOUTH VIETNAM.—Last fall, the battle cry of the U.S. Marines here was: "We'll be in Hoi An by New Year's Day 1966." Today, they estimate it will be New Year's 1968.

Hoi An is a provincial capital, only 15 miles south of the strategic airbase of Da Nang. The change in the marines' mood illustrates the changing role of American troops in Vietnam—and some of their problems.

"We could easily have fought our way to Hoi An," one marine said recently. "But then, we would have had to fight our way back. The essential problem of this war is not moving your front lines forward. It is keeping your rear covered."

The key to the problem lies in getting and keeping the support of the rural population. Without it, most authorities believe the war could go on for years.

So it was decided to halt the marines' advance until the Vietnamese could win over the local population. The decision brought dissent from within Marine Corps ranks and sneers from Army colonels, who claimed "the marines are afraid to go out and find the Vietcong." But gradually, the marine effort outside of Da Nang, under the direction of Marine Cmdr. Maj. Gen. Lewis Walt, began to dovetail with the work of the Vietnamese Government.

THIRD DIMENSION

"In a conventional war, progress is measured by an advancing front line," one official explained. "But in this war our outlying positions are constant. Progress must be measured in the third dimension. We must go down into the population to dig out the Vietcong infrastructure and then rebuild the local anti-Communist government."

The result of this coordinated effort was the Five Mountain Villages Campaign, less than 10 miles southwest of Da Nang and 15 miles from Hoi An. It is the principal current pacification program and a pilot case for the future.

"If this plan doesn't succeed here, it's not going to succeed anywhere else in the country," an official said. "We'll really be in serious trouble then."

The project already has run into some serious trouble.

The five villages of the campaign are subdivided into 19 hamlets, covering a 20-square-kilometer area. In the complex dwell 42,000 people, of whom about 7 percent are believed to be related to Vietcong. Snuggled among lush rice paddies, the villages are surrounded by the five peaks of mountains containing gray and salmon-colored marble. "These marble mountains would make a great tourist attraction, but you'd be killed going out there," one marine said.

The pacification campaign has three components: U.S. Marines are assigned to secure the outer limits of the area, patrolling to prevent the invasion by Communist units; Vietnamese paramilitary troops maintain security in the villages; Vietnamese civilian teams distribute goods, wage psychological warfare, take censuses, and attempt to undo the Vietcong's existing political devices and to bring the villagers to the Government's side.

"The role of the U.S. Marines is like an egg," an official said. "Our front lines, on the rim of the area, are the shell—but like a shell, the lines can be broken. The vital installation—the Da Nang airbase—is the yolk, and we also defend that. The white is the countryside, which we are trying to pacify and solidify."

On October 18, the Vietnamese forces began their effort, using one headquarters company and four understrength line companies of the 59th Regional Forces Battalion. A civilian cadre of 327 persons was moved in from provincial headquarters. The Vietnamese commander put them through a 2-week retraining course. They were joined by five Vietnamese People's Action Teams (PATs), of 10 persons each, who were responsible for census taking and other activities.

To each village, the Vietnamese command-

der, sent one Regional Forces company and one People's Action Team. In each of the 19 hamlets, he put a civilian cadre team.

"During the third week of the campaign, a 50-man Vietcong platoon broke through the marine blocking position. They were in our area shooting things up. They hit us hard," an official related.

"Five Regional Force troopers and several cadremes were killed. Each of our armed companies was understrength, so we had 15-man platoons where we should have had 35 men. Fighting against 50 Vietcong, of course, we lose against those odds."

"Until that we were just beginning to get the confidence of the people—but after that, the people clammed up and wouldn't tell us anything. And it also hurt the morale of our cadre. One whole 11-man team took off—but the district chief talked them into coming back," the official went on.

"Then, four nights later, the same Vietcong platoon hit us again. They slipped in between two Marine patrols, attacked the regional force headquarters unit of 17 men, killed several civilian cadre and kidnaped 2 women working with a drama unit. We haven't seen the women since. One of the American marines saw action from 50 yards away—but he couldn't open up with his machinegun—he would have killed more friendlies than enemies."

"Of course, the marines can't stop all small-unit infiltration. It would take marines shoulder-to-shoulder to do that. And once you had that, the Vietcong would mortar them from across the river, which they've already started doing," he said.

Since the late November action, the Vietnamese and the marines have slightly reinforced the area. Now the marines are not only holding the outer perimeter by extensive patrolling, they also are responsible for the securing of the civilian cadre in 11 of the 19 hamlets. Vietnamese troops defend the remaining eight.

TRY AGAIN

By mid-December, "we started pacifying again and things were moving slow, but good," the official said. "The people began giving us good intelligence and were turning in some Vietcong. For the first time, on a Sunday afternoon, families from Da Nang would come to the villages to visit their relatives. More than 100 families moved back into the area—but none of the people were of draft age."

On one night in late December, however, the Vietcong launched four harassing attacks. They hit the central command post with mortars and struck another People's Action Team, killing several.

Gradually, the cadre force fell from 331 to 304. Besides attrition, there were substantial problems with the cadre because of inadequate training and the fact that they were not natives of the villages in which they were working.

The PATs—equipped, paid, and trained for political activity and intelligence work by an arm of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency—had their own troubles. They were better armed than the Vietnamese troops, and the local commander wanted to use them for military security. They refused. One team defected and another had to be transferred because of local conflicts.

"The biggest headache is that we can't move our Vietnamese troops and cadre out of this 20-square-kilometer collection of hamlets until we have villagers here who can defend the area," the official said. "There's not one young man here between the ages of 10 and 38 whom we can recruit. We've lost the middle generation, and no one has begun to find an answer to that problem."

Before the Marines reach Hoi An—with their backs protected—80 square kilometers of land must be pacified. At that, the Ma-

*since estimate of
New Year's Day 1968, is
not far away.*

January 20, 1966

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TRIBUTE TO SARGENT SHRIVER

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, less than 18 months ago, the President, the Congress, and the American people declared war on poverty. Almost overnight many new programs existed where none had existed before. Today, the burden of 35 million of our citizens trapped in poverty is being lightened.

It would be unfair to all those dedicated men and women in Washington—and to all those citizens across America who have labored long and hard in this war on poverty—to credit one man with the progress to date.

But much of the success thus far in the crusade to eliminate human misery must be attributed to Sargent Shriver.

Four years ago, President Kennedy asked Mr. Shriver to lead another kind of crusade—the Peace Corps. Like the war on poverty, the Peace Corps was hard hit by its critics when it began. Mr. Shriver is fond of pointing out that President Kennedy gave him the job as Peace Corps Director because, if he failed, “it would be easier to fire a relative than a political friend.” But Shriver did not fail.

Before the Office of Economic Opportunity was a reality, its critics had doomed it to failure.

A political boondoggle * * * more hand-outs * * * another make-work program.

These were the mild statements.

Another furor arose when President Johnson asked Mr. Shriver to take on leadership of the poverty program while still guiding the Peace Corps.

The critics said “impossible.”

But they had been wrong about the Peace Corps and the war on poverty and they were wrong about the ability of Sargent Shriver.

In the Peace Corps, Shriver simply asked for men and women to volunteer for work all over the world, not for money or glory, not even for comfort or convenience, but only to help others who needed and wanted their help. In the war on poverty, he used the same kind of an appeal, challenging not only individuals, but an entire Nation to look inward at a neglected minority and do something about their condition.

“Eloquent” is almost too fragile a word to apply to this hard-driving man. But the challenges Sargent Shriver has made of us all—challenges to heed the cries of human beings asking for help—whether they came from the jungles of Peru or the hills of Appalachia—were eloquent challenges. And the Nation has responded.

Today, Sargent Shriver has only one task. With all of his skill and dedication applied to the war on poverty I think we can expect that worthy venture to soon reach the same lofty plateau of success and acceptance now enjoyed by the Peace Corps.

UKRAINIANS WILLING TO FIGHT FOR FREEDOM

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, January 22 marks the 48th anniversary of a day which is sacred to the more than one million Americans of Ukrainian descent.

It should also serve as a reminder to all the rest of our people and to freedom-loving people everywhere of the existence today of a form of imperialism which threatens all mankind. On January 22, 1918, with the Bolshevik armies invading their homeland, a group of Ukrainian patriots courageously proclaimed that centuries of foreign oppression were ended and that the Ukraine was an independent member of the family of nations.

Few battles for independence are won without blood and the creation of a free democratic state in non-Russian eastern Europe cost many Ukrainians their lives. But the freedom gained by the Ukraine was short-lived. The Red Army smashed the independence movement in characteristically ruthless fashion and with tactics that can be found in today's crises in southeast Asia.

The same basic Russian technique of civil war, liberation front and guerrilla warfare, combined with Red Army force, toppled the Ukrainian nation. Independent Ukraine ceased to exist. The Soviet Russian masters may have thought that the bloodletting and defeat of the Ukrainian Army meant the end of the people's desire for their nation's independence. But they were wrong. And the Russians were equally wrong in assuming that they had crushed the people's willingness to fight and to die for their freedom.

The Communists could not have been more wrong. Under the surface of foreign repression, the passionate desire for liberty from alien and Communist oppression continued. The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 was the spark which set off the explosion of the people to regain their national freedom. First against the German occupiers and then later against the returning Communist armies the Ukrainian people carried on a long, tenacious, heroic, and desperate guerrilla war.

They had their own army, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. It had the formal and complex organization of any modern army. It numbered perhaps 200,000. It fought the enemy until at least 1950, against terrible disadvantages, because it had one great advantage over the invaders—the love and loyalty of the people. This army did not receive aid from the outside world. Rather, it had to rely on its own ingenuity in utilizing weapons and supplies captured from the Soviets and the Germans. Constantly moving among the people, fully aware of the invaders' movements from local patriots, fighting a clever guerrilla war which sometimes included spectacular successes against larger and better armed enemies, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army added a glorious chapter to the epic of its people's struggle for freedom.

Although the Army has been disbanded, we can be sure that many of its members still carry in their hearts an unrelenting opposition to the Communist regime. An alien dictatorship has never been accepted willingly by the Ukrainian people. They have the recent memories of a gallant effort by their fighting men to liberate their land. On this anniversary it would be well for all

of us to remember that in this occupied land the spark of freedom still burns, fed by the pride in the thousands of sons who died not so long ago to repel the enemies from east and west.

THE TWO WARS IN VIETNAM

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the issue of January 24, 1966, of the U.S. News & World Report contains an excellent article entitled “The Untold Story of Vietnam War” which could just as easily be entitled the two wars in Vietnam—one that is known and one that is untold.

As summarized, the untold story is the one to be found in the countryside and in Saigon: Expanding terrorism, insecurity, a violent inflation, profiteering, food shortages, dealings with people who eventually will decide whether a viable nation can be put together.

I ask unanimous consent that the article referred to be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE UNTOLD STORY OF VIETNAM WAR

There are two wars here in South Vietnam—one widely known, the other virtually ignored.

The widely known war involves bomber strikes, U.S. soldiers, jungle battles, Vietcong battalions.

The untold story is the one to be found in the countryside and in Saigon: Expanding terrorism, insecurity, a violent inflation, profiteering, food shortages, dealings with the people who eventually will decide whether a viable nation can be put together.

In this other war—really the main one—the United States is losing ground.

The situation inside South Vietnam is found to be worse now than before the United States started moving in large numbers of troops last spring.

During the first week of January, Red guerrilla activity reached an all-time high—more than 1,100 “incidents” of sabotage, village raids, kidnappings—twice the rate of a year ago. As the Vietnamese New Year—January 21—approached, the number of Red attacks slackened markedly, but few authorities were convinced that it was permanent.

South Vietnam's normal distribution system has been severely disrupted, with consequent scarcities and high prices.

Food prices up: In the Saigon area, for example, the cost of rice has doubled in 6 months. Prices of chicken, cooking oil and other foods are up even more. It's the same with rents and clothing.

Black marketing is bad and getting out of control in some areas. So are pilferage and profiteering. In big cities the atmosphere seems infected by honky-tonks, get-rich-quick merchants and builders, and a general air of decay.

The \$600 million in U.S. economic aid that was poured into the country last year apparently has disappeared.

It boils down to this: While the United States is trying to build up the country's economy and to provide stability, the Communists keep tearing it down.

U.S. and South Vietnamese forces actually hold less territory now than they did a year ago. So-called pacified areas are not safe, and the highly touted American counterinsurgency campaign has not gotten off the ground.

Americans have promised to back the South Vietnamese Government with large-scale aid in the countryside, to convince

people they can find a better life by supporting the government.

Much of the time, the United States can't make good on the promise. Sometimes it is because the roads are cut and the Communists won't let help come through.

Even in more secure areas, the program to win the peasantry is a long way from being successful. The logistics bottleneck in Saigon, caused by the U.S. troop buildup and a \$400 million military construction program, is almost hopeless.

In many provinces during the last 8 months, less than 10 percent of the promised American aid has actually been delivered.

Where material has been delivered—steel and cement—you frequently find that local contractors would rather work on lucrative U.S. military projects. Some 100,000 Vietnamese are now working on military projects at wages higher than they could get in village programs.

The government's image in the countryside—where peasants for hundreds of years have been against all central governments—remains clouded at best.

Widespread corruption—at "almost a comic level," as one Vietnamese puts it—is not only giving the government a bad name, it is pouring millions of dollars into Communist coffers. One principal supplier for Marine Corps construction projects has been closely associated with the Communists since the days of the French colonialists—and is paying off handsomely to the Reds.

The Communists allow road traffic to pass in many areas only so they can collect "taxes" on the goods. Gasoline to power U.S. helicopters and planes in attacks on Reds in the Mekong River Delta is carried through Communist-controlled areas by transport companies owned by overseas Chinese. The carriers pay the Communists for permission to go through, then charge the Americans, at least indirectly.

Take a look at the First Corps area—the northern part of the Republic of Vietnam—and you see what has been happening. There are five provinces. The area has been given over to the U.S. Marines. They have put more than a division into the area, moving out from the strategically important airbases at the port of Danang and the newly created Chu Lai base.

However, the internal security is worse than before the Marine forces arrived. In the Province of Quang Nam, just outside Da Nang, and in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai, south of the Marine area. In two Provinces north of Da Nang, also, the situation is deteriorating.

Or take the Fourth Corps area, at the other end of the country. It covers the mouths of the Mekong River that flows out of Cambodia into Vietnam and on to the sea. In the last few months, the Communists have been forced by U.S. airpower, which is extremely effective in the flatland areas where there is little or no cover, to withdraw to their strongholds.

Yet the Reds have stepped up their terrorist assassination of village leaders and Government officials, and have put on a great new display of propaganda.

Reaction to air power: Use of American airpower to combat the growing size of the Communist forces has been—to villagers—the most important military fact of life for the past year. The Communists have taken a tremendous beating from the air. At the same time, these bombings have forced thousands of people to flee their homes and become refugees. At this point, no one is sure how many refugees there are, but certainly in the hundreds of thousands.

In many areas, a villager gets a bitter choice: be forced into labor battalions by the Communists, face assassination if he doesn't cooperate with the Reds, have his sons recruited for the guerrillas, and be bombed by United States and Government

planes—or move into Government areas as a destitute person, dependent on the whim of largely inefficient and sometimes corrupt officials for refugee relief.

Massive use of American airpower in the countryside is equated, in the minds of many villagers, with Red terrorism.

A village story: If you want to see how things are going at the village level, travel to Tu Thanh, only 6 miles from the Provincial capital in Quang Ngai Province.

Last May, a battalion of Communist troops swept into the village. They had with them Pham Kinh, a 52-year-old Communist. In 1954, Pham Kinh had withdrawn with 183 other Reds to the north when the Communists turned this area over to the Saigon Government.

Now Pham Kinh was back in his old area as political commissar for the Communist battalion.

The first thing that Pham Kinh did in the village was to arrest seven of the village leaders. Six were shot, and the seventh was buried alive. That was to make certain the villagers knew who was running the show.

Most of the villagers fled into Government-held areas, where they were fed and protected. It took the Government three attempts to liberate the area from the Reds. In the process, 40 percent of the houses in the village were destroyed by United States and South Vietnamese planes attacking Communist positions.

When the Communists withdrew, they took 40 village youths who had remained behind when most villagers fled. The youths will be indoctrinated as guerrilla troops.

Now the village is being rebuilt. Yet, if one of the chief aims of the government and the United States is to prove that they can do a better job than the Red, then they are failing.

Like the rest of South Vietnam, the area around Tu Thanh is agricultural and needs help with farming. But the U.S. admission in Saigon has only 25 staff members dealing with agriculture throughout the nation.

When pigs go hungry: A pig-and-corn program that began in 1962 with lots of U.S. fanfare does not even function in Quang Ngai Province. There is a good reason: You can't import corn to feed pigs when there is barely enough transport to feed the refugees. In this province, 1 of every 10 people is homeless.

Only recently did the province get a public-health nurse from U.S. headquarters to help reorganize the local medical corps.

There are only 900 native physicians in the entire country, and most are in the military. In one neighboring province, with 300,000 people, there are only 4 physicians, all in the service and meeting civilians' health needs on a part-time basis.

If it were not for millions of U.S.-administered inoculations against smallpox, cholera, plague, and typhoid, the country would be at the edge of a medical disaster.

Life in the cities, for those not on the "grave train" of profiteering, is grim. Inflation is making it that way. Since the start of 1965, money in circulation in South Vietnam has gone from 27 million piasters to 47 billion.

Inflation is fed not only by the vast U.S. construction program, but by private spending of 190,000 American soldiers. That spending alone runs between \$45 and \$60 a month per man.

The whole society seems turned upside down. A Saigon bar girl can make 80,000 piasters a month—about \$650—compared with Government salaries of \$120 for middle-echelon civilian officials or \$100 for a major in the South Vietnamese Army.

A Vietnamese college professor tells about meeting his former housemaid while he was on his motor scooter in downtown Saigon. The former housemaid, now the girl friend

of an American soldier, drove by in a shiny automobile.

There is talk of bringing in thousands of skilled workers from the outside—the Philippines and South Korea, for example—to take some of the pressure off the labor market and supply the technical help to unclog the ports.

You get some idea of what has happened to the labor market from the fact that a stevedore in Da Nang used to get about 30 cents for a day's work. Now, ricksha boys demand 75 cents from U.S. marines for a 10-minute carriage ride.

All this economic chaos has spurred the large-scale corruption that already existed. Government workers find that their fixed salaries buy only a fraction of what they once did. Shortages of goods make it easy for the seller to ask higher sums than those fixed by law. It is now commonplace to bribe one's way aboard local civilian transport—air or ground.

It is only in the past few weeks and months that the American Embassy and the U.S. military have decided to try to come to grips with some of these nonmilitary problems, in the cities and in the countryside.

A new U.S. program: On January 12, in Washington, U.S. aid officials announced a long-range program for winning the war in the countryside.

The reaction in South Vietnam among many was cynical: "On paper, one more U.S. plan to save the country."

Most veterans who know the situation are convinced that it would take between 6 and 10 years to win the war in Vietnam—and "win the peace."

Yet the intensity of the U.S. peace offensive indicates to most South Vietnamese that the United States is not about to undertake a commitment of 6 to 10 years.

In a country that has seen hundreds of promises by French and Vietnamese officials broken over the past 25 years, there would be great reservations about such a U.S. commitment in any case.

The fact is: The U.S. peace offensive has further shaken Vietnamese confidence. First came U.S. troops, and spirits went up. Now comes talk that sounds to Vietnamese like "peace at any price"—and spirits are down. The U.S. attempt to negotiate is seen here as a sign of irresolution, not determination to stay and fight for a decade.

All this is having a profound effect on the "forgotten war" in the thousands of villages where the fate of the country is likely to be decided.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

AMENDMENT OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MINIMUM WAGE LAW

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which is H.R. 8126.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 8126) to amend the District of Columbia minimum wage law to provide broader coverage, improved standards of minimum wage and overtime compensation protection, and improved means of enforcement.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

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MR. CALLAWAY. I thank the gentleman from Alabama. I would like to say that many of us are involved in a great many worthwhile projects in Vietnam. In my own district which includes Fort Benning, the home of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, we have Vietnam Mail Call and other wonderful projects.

But in my experience I have never seen anyone quite so enthusiastic about anything as these students are. I met a few weeks ago with about 20 of them at the home of a friend and we talked until midnight about their projects. These students are calling on people throughout the State every day. A project like this does not just happen. The enthusiasm of the students makes the project possible.

MR. HALL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

MR. CALLAWAY. I am happy to yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Missouri.

MR. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I too would like to add my words of commendation to the students of Georgia and to the gentleman in the well of the House for what he has so vividly brought to our attention about this program for the benefit of the people in this Chamber.

I hope his remarks will be read and that this program will be emulated by many people throughout the country and that it will bring you relief and encouragement in the fact that it has been started spontaneously, and may I say simultaneously, in other colleges.

On October 30, I had the privilege with one of my colleagues of this House to visit the Evangel College in my hometown of Springfield, Mo., where a "Back the Boys in Vietnam" program was started. Evangel College is generally a liberal arts college in my hometown which was originally church oriented to the Assemblies of God and who have their international headquarters there. This seems to be similar to the program that you have related about the students in Georgia and the "Back Our Boys" movement. And the student body has adopted a resolution which has been forwarded to the President of the United States as well as to General Westmoreland, the commanding general of the theater in South Vietnam. They also distribute bumper strips that encourage "Back Our Boys." It is an enlightened effort.

As a member of the Committee on Armed Services, it has been of vital interest to me—as well as to many others—to try to make an assessment of what the rabble-rousing, poorly informed, draft-card burners represent and portray of themselves to the troops in South Vietnam. It is an almost infinitesimal small percentage, less than one-hundredth of 1 percent. Of course, it is interesting though that the noise-making, publicity-seeking, television-camera-crowding reaction of these extremists and ultrapoorly informed people suggests those who before World War I formed the "I Won't Work" organization, and the "Peace-at-any-prices" before World War II. We seem always to have these few with us. They are our cross to bear. But they amount to very

little as far as the body politic and the informed opinion of our public is concerned. Thank goodness for the USO shows and the Bob Hope entourage at Christmastime which more truly reflects the attitude of the citizens, U.S.A.

I thank the gentleman for what he has done today.

MR. CALLAWAY. I thank the gentleman from Missouri for his contribution. I feel sure that the gentleman agrees with me that the best thing that might happen in respect to the events in Georgia is further emulation of what is being done in other States. The gentleman is, of course, aware that even though the people who will protest our policies in Vietnam may be a small portion of our people, the national attention they get is much more than that.

I have been told that Ho Chi Minh once said that he did not win the war against France at Dienbienphu; instead, he won when the people of Paris no longer supported that war. I have been told also that he now sees the same sentiment in the United States that he saw in Paris.

I believe it is totally different. I think the people of the United States do support our commitment to Vietnam, but it is important that those of us who do support that commitment be heard. It is tough to be heard when the press quite naturally wishes to hear dissenting opinions and not people who agree. That is why the enthusiasm of these young people is so important. They are enthusiastic. They must be heard. They will be heard. Ho Chi Minh will hear about Affirmation Vietnam. When he does, perhaps he will realize that his policy of continuing the war waiting for the collapse of U.S. support will not work.

MR. BUCHANAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

MR. CALLAWAY. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

MR. BUCHANAN. I wish to join in congratulating my colleague from Georgia for his remarks today, for his continued leadership in this field, and for the fact that he, for one, has certainly been vocal. He has demonstrated his interest in going to Vietnam and his repeated work in the House. I wish to congratulate also, and join my colleagues in congratulating, these young people in Georgia who have certainly set a fine example for the whole Nation. I think there is very little question that the American citizens stand behind our men in Vietnam.

As the gentleman has indicated, the tiny minority who take this opposite stand have received entirely too much press. I would say that in my own city we, too, have sought to demonstrate our support and make it concrete and real through the adoption of the 1st Infantry Division.

Various groups and clubs within my city of Birmingham have adopted various units of the division. Last Christmas they were flooded with mail, with gifts, and with other remembrances from the people of my city as an indication of our full support of what they are doing there.

I wish to congratulate your young people for an outstanding example of leader-

ship in making concrete the support we all feel for the cause in Vietnam.

MR. CALLAWAY. I thank the gentleman from Alabama. I commend the people of Birmingham for adopting the 1st Infantry Division, one of the fine units that is fighting in Vietnam today.

In closing I should like to say that these young people, in their enthusiasm, have not made the mistake of going off halfcocked. When I talked to them about it and explained to them how difficult it was to get publicity for those who supported our position as contrasted with those who do not support our position, they told me that they had an international press conference in New York with representatives of the international press, international editions of New York papers, and international magazines. At that time I asked them, "Why did you go to New York to do this?" realizing that Atlanta is the headquarters of this movement. They said, "Why, don't you know that New York is the headquarters for the international press?"

They had already been to people who were knowledgeable, who told them to get maximum international press coverage, they must go to the headquarters of the international press. They are working enthusiastically and hard and in a very meaningful way.

It is a real privilege for me at this time to present this information about enthusiastic Georgia students to the Members of this Congress.

WE CAN WIN IN VIETNAM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SIKES] is recognized for 30 minutes.

MR. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, the things which I say today are based on studies made in the war theater in December. Recommendations were made at that time to the Department of Defense as a result of these observations. They reflect the advice and opinion of senior U.S. military and civilian leaders there.

The past year has seen a rapid escalation of the effort of the United States in the war in Vietnam. This escalation has been marked by additional appropriations for defense, foreign aid, and State Department activities. It has resulted in increased military operations, bombing of a portion of North Vietnam, and increased airstrikes, including B-52 missions, in support of allied military operations in South Vietnam. Similarly, nonmilitary activities, including the programs of AID and USIA have been increased. These escalated programs have served to hold in check the efforts of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Government for a takeover in South Vietnam. However, they have not succeeded in bringing about a negotiated peace settlement, nor have they strengthened the military posture of South Vietnam to the extent that Government forces, U.S. and allied troops supporting their position, have been able to seize and hold the initiative.

Increased allied effort in this area has been matched by the increased involve-

ment of troops from North Vietnam over the Ho Chi Minh trail. This is not in reality a trail but is a well-developed, thousand-mile road system over which men and equipment flow steadily from North Vietnam, around the demilitarized zone into Laos, and southward in South Vietnam. Despite repeated bombings of military targets in North Vietnam and recently of the Ho Chi Minh trail, infiltration of weapons, supplies, and North Vietnamese regular army troops into South Vietnam is increasing. The monthly rate of these troops is estimated to be approximately 4,500.

These forces are well supplied with modern weapons and equipment of Communist manufacture which come through the port of Haiphong or over the two railroads from China. Other supplies move up the Mekong River and its tributaries or along the coast. The Communist forces are equally well supplied with food, most of which is obtained from the huge South Vietnam rice crop.

The present situation has been brought about by a variety of things, but in part by repeatedly underestimating the future actions of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. To some extent, our response to the requirements for the prosecution of the war have been based on estimates of what we thought the enemy would do rather than on their capabilities. Repeatedly these estimates have proven erroneous.

At the best, the prosecution of the war promises to be a lengthy affair. Under present ground rules, it can continue for many years. However, the war can be won and won speedily, if a determined effort is made which properly utilizes the power and capabilities of American fighting men and American resources, plus whatever help is available from our allies, and which reinforces the determination of the Vietnamese to win their own war.

Obviously, then, there is a necessity for the establishment of an atmosphere favorable to a stable government for freedom-loving people of a nation willing to stand up against Communist oppression. It can be created, but such a task will not be easy. We have given tremendous help in every category to South Vietnam. Nevertheless the efforts of this country to assist the Government of South Vietnam must be increased further.

This simply means that measures must be taken and taken at once to strengthen our position and that of the Government of South Vietnam for the prosecution of the war. This will require a number of actions. The cost will be high, but it is a cost which must be paid if we are to be successful. I will discuss primarily the military side of the picture.

Additional men and materiel must be supplied at once. We have about half enough of each in Vietnam to do the job. The South Vietnamese and their allies are already hard pressed for manpower sufficient to carry the war to the Communists. Many United States and South Vietnamese troops are required to pin down allied holdings and to perform other security duties. Last year's big buildup of forces seems at best to have

resulted only in containing the Communists. Open invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnamese regulars has changed the picture drastically. We cannot attain a healthy atmosphere until sufficient troops are available to search out, fight, and destroy Communist forces. We must be able to retake and hold South Vietnamese territory which is now largely in Communist hands. Bigger and bloodier battles are in store and it is essential that the forces and supplies necessary to win those battles be provided with a minimum of delay.

In other words, steps must be taken to increase our operational troop strength so that we cannot only contain the buildup of the North Vietnamese forces and those of the Vietcong, but be able to seize and hold the initiative. This is essential to victory. We cannot continue to operate at our present level and hope for more than a standoff. Failure to increase our forces and our effort will not only lead to a lack of success in the military field, but will place in jeopardy the lives of American military men now serving in Vietnam. Certainly no effort should be spared to give these troops, who are responding gallantly to their mission, the protection and support which they deserve.

If the present peace offensive fails, we can no longer afford to make a sanctuary out of the northeast industrial area of North Vietnam. This policy must be changed to permit essential military targets in the area to be neutralized by bombing or other effective measures. This means power, POL, airfield and port facilities, including those at Haiphong which serves as a major source of supply for the war economy of North Vietnam. Failure to do this can only assist the Government of North Vietnam in its escalation of the conflict and result in the deaths of more Americans. If the Government of Cambodia allows its ports and facilities to be used to supply the enemy, effective quarantine of these ports should be established. The pure and simple fact is that delivery of personnel, equipment, supplies and the weapons of war being made available in support of the Vietcong operations can best be stopped in North Vietnam or at least before it reaches South Vietnam.

Within South Vietnam itself, a large portion of the huge rice crop produced in this nation has, in recent years, gone to the Vietcong. In a limited way, inroads were made into the quantities of rice which Communists secured in 1965; however, far too much still went into their hands. This must be stopped. To do so will require larger military operation to protect those gathering the rice crops and to seize the rice bearing areas now in the hands of the Vietcong. For areas where this cannot be done, it is better to destroy the crop than to permit it to fatten Communists to kill Americans.

If food and supplies are denied to the enemy, I believe the war can be won in 1 to 2 years, despite ready Communist access to ample manpower. Failure to take strong steps can result only in the loss of lives of additional American, South Vietnamese, and allied servicemen

without resulting in successful military operations or the attainment of the just peace which we seek.

In major part, this is a war of logistics. Logistics and construction play an essential part and a limiting part in our operations in southeast Asia. Augmented U.S. forces—roughly twice as many as are now on duty there—must be sent into southeast Asia before success can be anticipated. We must be prepared to support them with food, weapons, equipment, bases, airfields, and ports. At this moment, it is barely possible to support forces already on duty there. Unless the required ports, airfields, and military camps can be constructed rapidly, our forces, and their supplies must be crowded somehow into existing facilities and effective military operations will necessarily be hampered, confused, and delayed. In other words we need additional troops and additional aircraft immediately. Yet there are limits on the numbers which can be sent to Vietnam simply because we cannot supply their needs. This is a situation which cannot effectively be overcome within months or even years at the present rate and method of procedures. Work has barely started or not started at all on some essential projects. Logistics is the limiting factor in the conduct of the war.

Let me reiterate, the construction effort in Vietnam, particularly the provision for port facilities and operational bases is vital to military operations. However, to this date there has been a marked lack of central authority and coordination in the construction efforts. Steps have been taken, in some instances effectively, to bring about a coordination between the construction and operational programs. But at best, it has been piecemeal. The proposal to establish a general officer position on the staff of the military advisory command to effectuate this coordination should be promptly implemented. This officer should report directly to the commanding general, and be responsible for the coordination of the construction effort and making it responsive to operational requirements.

An essential portion of the construction problem is the lack of a sufficiently skilled labor force in South Vietnam to meet the military construction effort which is required. Present contractor effort is requiring all of the available local labor force plus generating a requirement for the use of foreign labor. The latter proposal is not meeting with enthusiastic response from the South Vietnamese Government and will probably never be a fruitful source of labor for our construction effort. Still less desirable would be the importation of high-priced workmen from the United States because of price problems which their presence would generate. The construction battalions of the Navy and the Army are doing heroic work in their activities there. If the escalated construction program is to be successfully implemented, there is a need for more troop construction battalions from both the Navy and the Army. The requirement for these troops will be accentuated as additional facilities become operational

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and it is necessary to maintain them with troop labor. In order to meet the overall requirement for the construction and maintenance of facilities, steps should be taken as promptly as possible to drastically increase the troop construction units in South Vietnam including the activation of Air Force battalions to bolster the troop effort in this area.

The Reserve Forces of the Army and of the Navy also contain a large number of troop construction units. These are manned by skilled personnel who in most cases have been training for years to meet emergency situations. Certainly such a situation exists in southeast Asia today. There is a backlog of construction work in Vietnam today which could well be performed by troop labor. This requirement will be magnified by construction which will be necessary in support of the items in the January supplemental appropriation request. There will be questions on whether or not the transfer of all Navy Seabee construction battalions and Army Engineers construction battalions now deployed in other theaters of operation should be undertaken. Considerations must be given to whether we would seriously impair our military efficiency in the areas in which these troops are now operating. Regardless of this, there are available selected Reserve units capable of contributing to the construction effort in southeast Asia, either by their own presence there or by replacing Regular units who could then be transferred to this area without impairing our military requirements. Failure to utilize the services of all available units—Regular or Reserve—is handicapping and holding back the war effort at a time of great urgency.

Fourteen are now on duty in the theater. Their number can be increased fivefold by utilizing Regular and Reserve forces. They can make a tremendous contribution. It is inexcusable not to utilize their service. Whether to use them is one of the most important unresolved questions. We are fighting only one war and that is the place they are really needed.

Aside from troop labor considerations, your subcommittee finds that construction programs are based on the expectations that the contractor's labor supply can be increased threefold to fourfold. Contractor personnel at the time of the subcommittee's visit was 22,000. It is anticipated this number will have to be increased to 60,000 or possibly even 80,000. Completion of essential projects—ports, airfields, troop cantonments, and so forth—within the prescribed time is predicated upon securing additional contractor personnel. Witnesses in the theater stated that the supply of skilled labor is now virtually exhausted. I am convinced that very material contributions can be made through a more realistic vocational training program, but this will take time. It is planned to obtain approximately 10,000 third country nationals to alleviate the labor shortage. This still is a far cry from the 60,000 to 80,000 required. When it is taken into consideration that this number is needed to complete projects, programed for the troop structure already authorized, and

that the percentage of completion on these projects is now quite small, the enormity of the task ahead to provide facilities and accommodations for a troop level of 400,000 can be seen. We can provide the uniformed personnel much faster than we can provide facilities for their use.

The tremendous distances which must be overcome in providing more equipment and supplies for the Vietnamese war are seldom comprehended in the United States. South Vietnam is half way around the world from Washington. The great stretches of the Pacific mean that the bulk of logistic support must move by sea transportation. It is a long, long trip from the U.S. west coast to the docks of South Vietnam. Most of the ships which make the 20- to 25-day trip must wait for a period longer than their travel time across the ocean before space for unloading is available at dockside. In late November 120 ships were in Vietnamese waters and the waiting time before discharging cargoes was 28 to 30 days each. There the crews receive the higher pay authorized for those in danger areas and this further multiplies the cost.

The lack of port facilities in Vietnam is both geographical and historical. Saigon is the only major effective deepwater port. Additional deepwater facilities of a limited nature have been made available at Da Nang. These are being improved and expanded under existing construction programs. A completely new logistics base including deepwater facilities is now under construction at Cam Ranh Bay. Every effort must be made to expedite the construction of these facilities and additional facilities in the Saigon area or where needed.

Proper advance planning must be accomplished to see that port battalions and other personnel required for the operation of facilities of this type will be available as soon as any of them can be effectively utilized. In the meantime and probably for an indefinite period, greater reliance must be placed on over-the-beach landing and shallow port operations which would lessen the strain on existing port facilities and permit an expedited flow of supplies more quickly than will be available through the completion of ports now under construction. Even with the completion of planned port facilities, any escalation in the military effort will require more effective logistics operations.

It is fallacious reasoning to think that the completion of deepwater port facilities will meet all logistics requirements for port facilities. The escalation in numbers of troops and military operations which must take place if we are to be successful in attaining our objectives in South Vietnam will place increasing workloads on all port facilities.

Shallow water ports do exist in South Vietnam and are available for shallow draft vessels. This will mean moving additional landing craft type vessels into the area as well as others of the type capable of utilizing such port facilities. It is essential that greater use be made of LST type vessels, and that greater reliance be placed on seagoing tugs and

barges and on lighterage equipment. Steps should be taken to activate all required additional vessels of this type in the reserve fleet, including those available to the Military Sea Transport Service. Consideration should be given to transferring those vessels now serving in other parts of the world to the southeast Asia area wherever practicable in keeping with other military requirements and the obtaining of this equipment from stocks of other nations.

Steps should be taken at once to implement realistic plans for utilization of the type of equipment described above.

Many of the ships servicing the forces in Vietnam are chartered from private shipping firms. This is a necessary but costly requirement. The cost is compounded by the problem of the long wait to discharge their cargo. Certainly, consideration should be given to placing high priority cargo in these ships and to unloading them quickly so that costly delays are not incurred.

One basic requirement in the logistics-construction field is for additional funds to be made available for the construction of adequate facilities and for the logistical support essential to our troops in Vietnam.

Consideration should be given to making a large portion of these funds available directly to the Military Advisory Command in Vietnam—MACV—rather than to the individual military services. This is particularly true with reference to the construction portion of the logistics effort. Construction should be accomplished wherever possible without fiscal and programing restrictions and with complete flexibility. This has not been the case in the past but must be done now if our troops in this area are to be properly supported.

It is very difficult for the logistics effort to respond to the changing operation's program under present limitations and regulations. The military command in Vietnam should be provided with greater flexibility in the use of funds. Wartime conditions which are existent in Vietnam today, simply do not permit a continuation of peacetime operating conditions within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. To allow existing conditions in this area to continue will increase the number of costly delays which have taken place to the detriment of the overall military operations.

In addition to providing increased funds for specific construction line items, a reserve of funds should be established and made available to the command in Vietnam for changes in scope of projects and increased cost of construction as requirements change.

Additional preprogramming functions are necessary in the construction program in order to formulate the coordinated construction-logistics effort which is necessary to support the operational requirements.

The lack of total funding now precludes adequate advance procurement of materials and restricts contractor mobilization. Both are essential if the construction program is to be responsive to operational requirements. These actions require long lead times of a minimum of

4 months. Advance funds should be made available for the immediate requirement. They should continue to be made available in the future because this requirement is a continuing one and will increase as the construction program escalates.

However, money is not everything. Money already is available which cannot be expended. There is still too much paperwork on programing, on requisitions for construction material, and on other needed supplies. Requisitions sometimes takes weeks or even months for approval. The lack of preprograming to assess actual requirements for construction and the ability to meet these requirements is stressed. This is partially attributable to peacetime procedures which necessitate too much paperwork.

In another area too much equipment, especially construction equipment has been deadlined throughout the area for lack of spare parts. The situation is improving and will continue to improve as additional port facilities are made available. There is now a shortage of spares, worldwide, and this must be faced up to. There is a need, however, for greater emphasis, not only on making additional spare parts available, but also in changing the length of the time for replacement of equipment to one which is more in keeping with the conditions in Vietnam. For example, the construction contractor plans for the amortization of his equipment on the basis of 18 months usage. If this is realistic, and apparently it is from experiences to date, equipment of the troop construction units should also be programed on this basis rather than the 2- to 3-year cycles now anticipated.

I am disturbed by the fact that equipment and material requirements for the war in Asia do not command top priority in the American marketplace. Military witnesses state that other governmental programs, such as NASA, Polaris, and the missile program, all have a priority higher than the war effort. The moon will wait. The other programs are well along toward completion. It appears unrealistic not to give the highest priority to a program which is taking the lives of American youths.

The supply situation is further aggravated by the fact that most of the roads and railroads in Vietnam can be utilized only to a limited extent if at all by United States and South Vietnam forces. The Communists control most of the countryside and can cut many important highways almost at will. Only limited stretches of the country's one railroad can be used. That places the burden largely on air transportation and creates inordinate demands on our ability to provide and maintain a sufficient number of aircraft to supply U.S. forces who are located away from port areas. Thus far, the job has been done with remarkable ability. I found no instances where key operations have been prevented for lack of essential supplies. Nevertheless, the problem is a critical one and the situation will be greatly improved if sufficient forces can be made available to open and maintain essential highways and railroads.

Since it is necessary to supply many of our bases in South Vietnam by airlift, we must accept the fact that escalation of our efforts in this area will increase the requirements for airlift support of our troops. Consideration will have to be given to the utilization of C-123 and C-130 aircraft in much greater numbers than those now available in southeast Asia until highway and road transportation can be opened. This is a part of the story of the need for sufficient U.S. and allied assistance to enable the A.R.V.N. to seize and hold the initiative in land warfare.

The B-52 bombing activities in southeast Asia are required in support of our ground operations. As our military planners become more aware of their potentialities and more experienced in their use in a war of this type, their effectiveness will be even greater than at present. The aircraft presently used are based at Anderson Air Force Base, Guam. The flight to southeast Asia is long and requires refueling for a round trip mission. Steps should be taken to secure an additional site for these aircraft closer to the target area so that the present costly refueling and long and wearing flights on personnel and aircraft can be avoided. There are several locations available if proper authority can be obtained from other nations. In the case of utilization of one of these sites—Okinawa—no such additional authority would be required. But it would be necessary to move some tanker-type aircraft to other locations.

Naval aviation is playing an effective role in the conduct of the war. Due to the limitation on the number of carriers presently available to the 7th Fleet, it is not possible to provide sufficient naval aviation support on station at all times to meet the operational needs. The escalation of our military operations and the presence of additional troops will cause an added burden on the units providing air support. The construction of land facilities for Air Force and Marine aircraft even at an accelerated rate will still probably lag behind the operational requirements. Consideration should, therefore, be given to the assignment of additional carriers to the 7th Fleet so that this required air support can be made available to our operational troops.

The A-6A is a Navy aircraft newly assigned to the 7th Fleet. It is the only aircraft in any of our forces with a night reconnaissance and bombing capability. Although it may have minor deficiencies, this single factor dictates that its use and number in Vietnam be expanded. Consideration should also be given to adapting the night reconnaissance equipment of this aircraft to existing aircraft available to the Navy, Marine, and Air Force. Research and development should be implemented at once which would lead to the provision of adequate night reconnaissance and bombing capability for aircraft employed or to be employed in this area.

Naval gunfire has played a role in supporting the operations in Vietnam. The nature of the terrain and long shoreline of this country makes naval gunfire often effective when used in support of military operations. Consideration should

be given to strengthening the 7th Fleet, so that additional naval gunfire might be made available. This might require the activation of ships from the reserve fleet, including some which are equipped with heavier guns than those presently available.

I should comment on the intelligence picture. It is generally agreed that the intelligence system in Vietnam requires more personnel who have better training for the job to be done. There is a definite need for better coordination and more skillful interpretation of information to permit a quicker response at policy levels.

For instance, there frequently is a lack of followthrough on bombing missions to assess results and to permit fullest advantage to be taken of enemy losses. Informed witnesses feel that intelligence-gathering is neither broad enough nor detailed enough and that stronger efforts are needed, both in military and in civilian application. As an illustration, our forces have no accurate information on Vietcong supply forces. Civilians and coolies seen on the streets may, in fact, be Vietcong pipeline forces. Undoubtedly, some U.S.-employed Vietnamese are also working for the Vietcong. Often, detailed information at the village level regarding Communist sympathizers and local Communist organizations is nonexistent.

Apparently there is a strong Communist underground which on occasion is able to report important events to Hanoi, where they are broadcast before they are known generally to United States and allied government forces. These are parts of the intelligence problem to be coped with.

Now to turn to the field of psychological warfare, I am convinced there is a definite need for improved program direction which can best be provided through having a director who is responsible solely for this program. Good work is being done in this area, but its potential is far from being realized. It should be kept in mind that the Vietcong is highly vulnerable to psychological warfare operations. There is much capital to be made of the fact that refugees flee only to the South Vietnamese. The Vietcong tax and conscript, and seize the rice crop, and offer nothing in return. The Saigon government offers a much greater hope to the villagers for the future. These things should be emphasized over and over again. They are only token examples among many.

Recreation facilities for American personnel, particularly for enlisted men, remains one of the serious problems throughout southeast Asia. Granted that there is not much time for recreation, the fact remains there are leave periods when our personnel can get away from their exacting duties for short periods. For these periods, there is in most areas a dearth of wholesome recreational facilities. The alternative is the nearest local counterpart of honky tonks and other places of questionable value. Additional emphasis on adequate recreational activities and facilities remains very important.

There is a need to train additional skilled labor throughout South Vietnam. This is not only true from the standpoint

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of our present military construction and logistics requirement, but from the standpoint of the future economy of the country. This should involve vocational training on a much larger scale than is taking place now or is contemplated through present programs. A realistic vocational training program would remove much of the necessity to seek additional skilled labor from foreign nations to meet anticipated needs in the construction field.

In addition steps should be taken to establish vocational and agricultural type training for skills of the type needed in the villages in order that more people can become self-supporting.

The increasing activities of the South Vietnamese and allied military operations have led to thousands of refugees leaving their homes to escape Vietcong oppression or because of the displacements which are a problem of any war. It is a problem which is helped in South Vietnam by the nature of the people who have a longstanding tradition of caring for their own and assisting those who are homeless. Yet it is a problem which cannot be resolved through reliance upon these means alone. The numbers are far too great even now. Escalation of military operations will increase these numbers and with it the problem. These refugees are basically anti-Communist because they have felt the heel of Communist oppression. As such, they can be effectively utilized to tell their story to others who may be wavering in their support of the Government or who do not know what oppression of this type can mean. These people cannot be used to get their story across nor are they likely to remain anti-Communist if they are caused to suffer unnecessary hardships and privations in their new homes. As they are a source for good today, they can become, as history has proven in other areas, a source of instability if their basic needs are not met.

It is obvious that a coordinated long-range program to meet the refugee problem is not available today. There seems to be too much of an attitude that the problem can be overcome by passing out limited material aid and allowing the local populace to attempt to assimilate the refugees. This is impractical. It cannot be accomplished. The South Vietnamese will assimilate every refugee humanly possible. It is their nature, but the numbers are far too great. There is immediate need for a large program for the resettlement of these refugees in areas where they can support themselves in new homes or at least until the time when they can return safely to their home villages. A little has been done but such areas must be established in a greater quantity than has been done to date. This resettlement should be coupled with increased vocational training, with primary emphasis on agriculture and in locally needed skills. Failure to accomplish this will add to the instability of the Government, but if accomplished it will allow these proud and industrious people to contribute, not only to their own support, but to that of the countryside about them.

Any report on the war in Vietnam should include an especial commendation for medical and hospital units whose responsibility it is to heal the wounded and sick and to contribute to the maintenance of health of U.S. personnel. Although faced with serious problems—some of them almost insurmountable due to large numbers of sick and wounded for whom no theater hospital facilities had not been made available—they improvised and met every requirement in admirable fashion. Unanticipated problems with new and virulent strain of malaria, which frequently exceeded battle casualties in number, added to the difficulties. However, your subcommittee found no instances of inability to meet the pressing demands placed upon medical personnel nor cases of shortage of essential medical supplies. In part the problems were met by air evacuating sick and wounded to the Philippines and thence to convalescent hospitals in other areas. There are cases where battle wounded were receiving treatment at Clark Field, Philippines, within 6 hours from the time the injury was received. This policy of air evacuating sick and wounded is not the most desirable procedure, but it served to insure prompt and adequate treatment. Additional hospital facilities are under construction which should soon permit in-theater treatment for all emergency and short-term cases.

We were briefed many times during the course of my work in southeast Asia. It is the belief of this committee that briefing procedures can be modified materially to the benefit of staff personnel without taking away from the value of the briefings. It was noted that in most instances, briefing teams comprised essentially all of the top staff members of the respective groups. Although 20, 25, or even more staffers might be present, the briefing was conducted essentially by 2 or 3 individuals. Most of the others took no part. Although appreciative of the efforts of the U.S. units to provide a detailed picture it is respectfully suggested that three or four well-informed staff members could do the job, freeing others for pressing work which always awaits them. It is suggested also that film clips showing areas and actions could well be substituted for much of the detailed information on organization and mission. In other words, a great deal of time for the briefing teams can be saved without taking away from the effectiveness of the briefings.

It would have been impossible for me and other Members of Congress to accomplish our mission in Vietnam without the outstanding cooperation and helpfulness extended by both the military and civilian personnel in the areas visited. Every effort was made to provide all possible assistance. The work of the staff of the Committee on Appropriations and of the legislative liaison officers involved in the planning and execution of the trip was outstanding. The wholehearted support of all those who participated in this endeavor is deeply appreciated.

No report would be complete without a high tribute to the morale and valor of

America's fighting men in southeast Asia. Their contributions have been and are magnificent. Their will to win, their morale and their esprit de corps is of the highest. Their valor and ability in battle, their friendly relations with the local populace and their untiring efforts to assist these people in the problems which they face in their everyday lives are in the highest tradition of the American military service. They know why they are fighting in Vietnam. They are satisfied that their missions and objectives are proper ones and they are dedicated to the achievement of those objectives with every means at their disposal, including their lives. No lesser contribution is being made by the many civilians in our military and many of our non-military programs who are living and working side by side with many of our military personnel. Even a brief association with these people and a short glimpse into their lives in Vietnam makes one proud to be an American. In every area, they have the will to win. They deserve and they need the full and unlimited support of the American people and of their Government.

SUMMARY

This will be no easy war. Many unresolved problems confront us. The ground rules under which U.S. forces fight will have to be changed. It is necessary that the North Vietnamese port, power and industrial complex which supply Communist forces be neutralized or the war will go on indefinitely. Continuation of the sanctuary now provided those facilities in North Vietnam will mean continued escalation of conflict and more American deaths. Cambodian ports should be quarantined if that country insists on supplying the enemy. The bulk of South Vietnam's huge rice crop now goes to the Communists. This, too, will have to be stopped. If food and supplies are denied to the enemy, I believe the war can be won in 2 years despite ready Communist access to ample manpower.

Additional U.S. forces, supplies, bases, and port facilities must be provided at once. We appear to have underestimated Vietcong and North Vietnamese capabilities in number and supplies. The buildup of opposing forces has not permitted us to seize and hold the initiative. This is essential to victory. The lives of American servicemen are at stake in this operation and no effort should be spared to give them the protection and support they deserve.

Logistics and construction play an essential part in successful U.S. operations in southeast Asia. Unless ports, airfields and military camps can be constructed more rapidly, our forces and supplies must be crowded onto existing facilities and effective operations are delayed. The available labor force of South Vietnam is being utilized effectively but the number of skilled manpower is limited. Greater dependence should be placed in Seabees and Army engineer construction battalions through the transfer of additional units and call-up of reserves. Air Force aviation maintenance battalions should be activated

to bolster construction forces in the combat area. Much broader vocational training programs should be instituted for South Vietnam and Thailand personnel without delay. There is a need for additional skilled labor throughout the area which can be provided from local sources. This is true not only from the standpoint of the future economy of the nations involved but also because of the requirement for skilled workers in military construction and logistics problems.

We recommend that steps be taken to develop another B-52 site closer to southeast Asia. Guam, the present site, is far removed from the target area and the long flights represent unnecessary wear and tear on men and equipment and require costly refueling operations. A number of such alternate sites are available.

More effective use can be made of naval aviation if additional carriers are provided. This will permit naval aircraft to be on station for a greater length of time than is presently possible. Strengthening of the surface craft in the 7th Fleet will also permit heavier gunfire to be made available to our land forces in operation near the coast.

Greater reliance on over-the-beach landing operations would lessen the strain on existing port facilities and permit an expedited flow of supplies more quickly than will be available through the completion of ports now under construction. This will mean making greater use of LST's and similar landing craft wherever available and placing greater reliance on seagoing tugs and barges. Through the use of such equipment, many ships which now wait for days in the rivers and harbors of Vietnam to discharge cargo can be offloaded onto equipment which utilizes shallow ports or beach landing operations.

There is a need in the logistics construction field for additional money to be made available directly to the military command in Vietnam under regulations which provide greater flexibility. War-time conditions simply do not permit peacetime operating practices to be followed without costly delays. Some funds already provided through supplemental appropriations are not yet available. In other construction cases appropriation processes need to be speeded up in the field. A reserve of funds should be made available for changes in scope and cost of construction as requirements change in the theater. Work has barely started or not started at all on too many essential projects in the theater.

Additional preprogramming is needed and it is probable that this can be expedited if additional planning personnel are made available. However, it is apparent that high enough priorities are not being given construction requirements in the war theater. Top priority is not being given to some of the equipment and material needs in Vietnam.

Too much equipment has been deadlined throughout the area for lack of spare parts. The situation is improving but there is a need for greater emphasis on making spare parts available. Much equipment is in short supply and when equipment cannot be used for lack of spare parts, the loss is doubly costly.

In nonmilitary activities there is a requirement for more positive direction and emphasis, especially in our efforts in psychological warfare. In this connection, tribute is paid to American teams, including AID, Peace Corps, and Armed Forces medical teams, who through direct contact with villagers have presented a new and needed picture of the U.S. intentions and helpfulness to the Vietnamese.

The refugee program in South Vietnam also remains a problem. There is a need for a better coordinated refugee program with stress being placed on the resettlement of refugees in areas where they can contribute, primarily through agriculture, toward their own support and that of the countryside.

We wish to pay highest tribute to the morale and valor of America's fighting men in southeast Asia. Their contributions are magnificent. They have the will to win and they deserve the full and unlimited support of the American people.

THE TRICONTINENTAL CONFERENCE IN CUBA: A THREAT TO WORLD FREEDOM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PUCINSKI] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, between January 3 and 15, some eleven hundred miles from Washington, but only 90 miles from Key West, Fla., a most significant event took place in the capital of Cuba.

Last July 26 in my speech on Cuba, I warned that a tricontinental meeting of Communist representatives would be held this January in Cuba. That meeting did in fact occur and its deliberations should be of monumental concern to all who value freedom.

Last Saturday, after 13 days of deliberation, this conference of the Asian, African, and Latin American Communists came to a close in Havana. Sponsored by the Communist powers, organized by known Communists, and attended by pro-Communist delegates and observers from 82 countries, including official delegations from the Soviet Union and Communist China, the tricontinental conference represents a direct and major threat to the stability of Latin America and, consequently, a danger to the whole of the Western Hemisphere.

As a cofounder of the Cuban Freedom Committee which operates Radio Free Cuba, I have followed the progress of this meeting with great concern.

Our staff, which maintains close contact with activities in Cuba, has compiled a comprehensive record of the conspiratorial meeting and I should like today to present briefly some of the highlights of this meeting which most directly affect us as free Americans.

I believe that the conclusions and objectives agreed upon at this meeting clearly show that this conference represents the beginning of the most important Communist effort to penetrate Latin America since the Castro takeover in Cuba in January 1959.

That the Castro regime is the willing tool and promoter of international communism's desire to intensify subversion and terrorism throughout the continent and the world becomes more evident daily.

Mr. Speaker, I believe there is a direct correlation between our struggle in Vietnam and the Communist meeting in Havana last week.

If the United States were ever to be driven out of Asia, such a defeat would give the green light for Communist subversion all over the world.

Last week's meeting of Communist leaders in Havana clearly spelled out the blueprint for waging subversion and terror as the new mode of coordinated Communist aggression.

In the last days of the tricontinental conference it was decided that the executive secretariat and liberation committee—with four representatives from Latin America, four from Africa, and four from Asia on each committee—should have their headquarters in Havana, Cuba.

The avowed purpose of the liberation committee is to channel aid and materials for insurrection throughout Latin America. This is the first time that Moscow and Havana have formally set up an office for international communism in Havana.

Because of the Havana conference's importance, the American people should know, and this Chamber should thoroughly investigate, the significance of the pronouncements made during its sessions, the role of Communist Cuba as host nation, and the final results and future consequences of the gathering.

Too often preoccupied with events in Vietnam, we unfortunately fail to attach proper importance to portentous events in our own backyard.

The aims of this conference greatly affect our security, the safeguard of which is our prime duty. President Monroe in 1823 outlined that responsibility when he declared that the United States would consider any attempt of an extra hemispheric power to extend its system to any portion of this hemisphere, dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.

The celebration of the tricontinental conference in Havana was agreed upon in Cairo last May, when the so-called African-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, decided to expand its activities and include Latin America in its ranks.

Although Communist Cuba is going through a serious economic and financial crisis, lavish preparations were carried out in Havana for the conference, and the best facilities were offered to about 600 delegates and observers, all declared guests of the Castro regime. The Havana Hilton Hotel—now called the Havana Libre—was the site of the meetings and was declared off limits for the public.

According to the official Cuban announcement, the principal points on the conference's agenda were as follows:

1. The struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism.
2. Support for Vietnam against U.S. imperialist aggression and for the liberation